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Abstract
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium
theory, which may provide useful information to Nevada’s state policymakers as they seek to
address the state’s educated workforce needs via postsecondary governance reform. This study
sought to explore the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors responded as
they did and the context in which they responded by examining the life cycle of three unique
higher education governance reform bills. Interviews with 12 policy actors and review of over
150 public documents revealed three overarching themes: (1) public support of AJR 11 was
insufficient to overcome a structure-induced equilibrium created by the Nevada Constitution; (2)
the policy solution AB 331 offered was too extreme and complex to garner legislative support;
and (3) perchance, unconventional tactics AJR 5 cosponsors employed in the legislative
policymaking process of AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation that ultimately
reforms Nevada’s higher education governance entity.
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Chapter 1
Overview
Introduction
Research has suggested America is “losing ground in postsecondary education relative to
our competitors...increasing our supply of skilled labor is central to the vitality of the U.S.
economy” (Carnevale & Rose, 2014, p. 13). Some states have attempted to address this loss
through governance reform and policy means. For example, governors in California and
Colorado have aimed to strengthen their statewide coordinating boards (Toppo, 2019). Similarly,
the Nevada legislature is presently seeking greater oversight of their statewide higher education
governing board. To be sure, states and their postsecondary governance entities play an essential
role in facilitating public higher education performance and achieving important public priorities.
The National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education has suggested, “traditional
decision-making entities, built for other times and other public purposes and based primarily on
institutionally focused issues, will crowd out attention to critical public priorities” (2005, p. 3a).
In Nevada, 62% of jobs will require postsecondary education beyond 2020 (Carnevale, Smith, &
Strohl, 2013). At 55%, Nevada’s current average attainment level falls short in meeting its
educated workforce needs (Carnevale et al., 2013). In contrast to many states, who over time
have reformed their higher education governance structures through legislation (see McLendon,
2003b), the state of Nevada has maintained its single state-level higher education governance
system largely intact since its creation in 1864. While the legislature has marginally adjusted the
number of regents and their term limits, they have not enacted legislation that reforms the higher
education governance structure or changes its authority arrangement. Consequently, Nevada’s
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single state-level governance structure for higher education exists today as it did in 1864 despite
the state’s workforce needs and National Center’s call for change.
Purpose
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium
theory. As previously illustrated, research has suggested Nevada falls short in meeting its
educated workforce needs. A study of Nevada’s state-level policymaking process as it pertains to
higher education governance reform legislation may provide useful information to Nevada’s
state policymakers as they seek to address the state’s workforce deficiency via postsecondary
governance reform.
Research Questions
The primary research question guiding this study was: How has the state of Nevada’s
legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education
governance entity? A secondary question asked: How is the legislative policymaking process of
the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to
and/or different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly
Bill 331, two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?
Overview of Literature
Three bodies of literature helped establish a framework for examining how the state of
Nevada’s legislative policymaking process has facilitated the preservation of its higher education
governance entity. The first group introduced the role of states in higher education from a
historical perspective. The second group examined state actors and how they have affected
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public higher education. Finally, the last body of literature addressed state-level governance
structures and their influence on higher education.
A Brief History: The Role of States in Higher Education
While the American federal government has played a supporting role in postsecondary
education, mostly in terms of financial assistance and research (Mumper, Gladieux, King, &
Corrigan, 2016), state governments have held primary responsibility for public higher education
sanctioned by the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Since American colonial colleges
were established, the role of states in higher education has been dynamic and consequential. Both
state-level financial support, and control and oversight of public postsecondary institutions, have
fluctuated as states have responded to changing societal and economic demands.
During the eighteenth century, states supported private and public institutions via public
land grants, lottery authorizations, and funds derived from general tax revenues (Heller, 2004).
However, in the nineteenth century, shortly after the 1819 landmark case of Dartmouth College
in which the state of New Hampshire failed to gain control of the state-chartered school, states
largely stopped funding private schools and concentrated appropriations on public institutions
(Heller, 2004). With the increase of state subsidies to public universities came new demands for
state oversight and control of these institutions. Expansion of state-level governance entities
continued as state universities and normal schools multiplied with the enactment of the 1862
Morrill Land Grant Act (Heller, 2004).
In the first half of the twentieth century, higher education witnessed a climactic shift from
a private good purchased mainly by elites to an essential societal investment, as student veterans
flooded college campuses and the nation responded to the space race with the Soviet Union’s
launching of Sputnik. As economic and public demands for higher education grew so did the role
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of states in postsecondary education. New statewide coordinating boards were essential to
creating higher education capacity through creation of master plans and funding strategies to
provide resources across institutions (McGuinness, 2016a). The trend during the 1950s into the
1970s reflected centralized and consolidated governance structures driven by demand for public
accountability as student enrollments expanded (McLendon & Ness, 2003). However, that trend
disappeared in 1980s and 1990s, as some states granted greater institutional autonomy through
decentralization while other states claimed more control in order to increase efficiencies and
reduce costs (McLendon & Ness, 2003). State financial support of higher education during this
time was marked by declining appropriations, which generally has continued across the nation
today.
Nearly two decades into the 21st century, the role of states in higher education remains
influx as states face a myriad of ongoing environmental pressures from limited state budgets to
public demands for higher education affordability and accountability. Some states still seek
postsecondary governance reform as a way to address these pressures. Lyall (2013) has
suggested the role of states in higher education will likely remain subject to change and reform
given the dynamic environment. Thus, whether by drift or by design, the role of states in
postsecondary education will continue to fluctuate during the twenty-first century (Viggiani &
Szczerbacki, 2015).
State Actors and Their Influence on Postsecondary Education
The relationship between state governments and higher education is complex and
essential. From governors, to legislatures, to State Higher Education Executive Officers
(SHEEOs), a multitude of state actors influence higher education. In many states governors
wield significant power in allocating state funds and shaping tax policy, both of which may
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impact higher education (Lingenfelter, Novak, & Legon, 2008). In addition, most governors have
authority to appoint members of statewide governance boards while some governors also have
authority to appoint members of institutional boards. Similar to governors, state legislatures are
major actors in higher education. They shape policy for postsecondary education in various
ways, such as “creating a demand for improvement, setting the terms of accountability, and
deciding how much money is provided and where it may be spent” (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p.
9). Hendrickson, Lane, Harris, and Dorman (2013) have contended the most influential
legislators are often members who sit on higher education and budget committees. Largely
advisors to governors and legislatures, the duties of SHEEOs vary across states. However,
SHEEOs, like state-level postsecondary governance entities, serve as key links between state
governments and higher education. Thus, they may often find themselves navigating between
public policy and politics to be effective (Wellman, 2006).
State-Level Governance Structures and Their Influence on Higher Education
Although no two states are exactly alike in their approach to postsecondary governance,
all states have at least one entity responsible for the governance of public universities and
colleges (Fulton, 2019b; McGuinness, 2016b). Generally, states employ two types of centralized
governance structures: coordinating boards and governing boards (Hendrickson et al., 2013).
While statewide coordinating boards are often built to facilitate collaboration across institutions,
statewide governing boards maintain operational authority over the higher education system.
Consequently, statewide governing boards generally exhibit greater control over public
postsecondary institutions than coordinating boards. Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have argued the
strength of coordinating boards lie in their “ability to focus on broad policy issues and to devote
considerable attention to the data and information required to advise the elected leaders
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responsible for making policy and allocating public resources” (p. 8). Likewise, effective
statewide governing boards are able to simultaneously focus on state priorities and institutional
aspirations (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). Whether coordinating or governing, most boards “are
designed to provide a “built-in” connection of business and civic leaders to the higher education
public policy dialogue, and to provide a permanent forum for higher education policy that is
partially insulated from the give and take and discontinuities of the partisan political process”
(Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 6).
Theoretical Framework
Grounded in evolutionary biology, punctuated equilibrium theory provides a framework
to understand the public policymaking process during times of stasis and change (Baumgartner
& Jones, 1993, 2009). Punctuated equilibrium theory contends the policymaking process is
defined by long periods of stability and incremental policy change. Occasionally, the process is
marked by major policy change as policy images are redefined and policy issues shift from
monopolistic policy venues, or policy subsystems, into the larger macropolitical arena. During
periods of equilibrium, policymaking takes place away from the public eye within individual
subsystems comprised of bureaucratic experts and interest groups. In times of dramatic policy
change, however, policymaking moves beyond policy subsystems and often occurs under
heightened public and media attention.
McLendon (2003b) has suggested punctuated equilibrium theory is a relevant policy
framework to study state-level higher education governance reform. He has recommended
researchers focus on four interdependent concepts:
(1) the functioning of policy subsystems of issue specialists which routinely make higher
education governance policy; (2) the ways in which policy images create and sustain
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monopolistic control over governance issues by a particular subsystem; (3) policy
entrepreneurs' strategic use of issue-redefinition to mobilize previously disinterested
parties, thus expanding conflict to new policy venues; and (4) the "punctuation" which is
theorized to occur when shifting images and venues permit macropolitical institutions to
intervene into governance policymaking. (p. 122)
According to McLendon (2003b), a punctuated equilibrium approach to the study of higher
education governance reform should reveal policymaking marked by periods of stability and
change. My research study primarily sought to explain elements of stability in state legislative
policymaking related to higher education governance reform in Nevada, thus acknowledging
McLendon’s first two concepts. The third and fourth concepts were relevant as well since the
study compared similarities and differences between the ongoing policymaking process of
Assembly Joint Resolution 5, and the historical policymaking processes of two higher education
governance reform initiatives (i.e., Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331) that
were not passed. Thus, punctuated equilibrium theory provided a sound theoretical framework to
advance an understanding of Nevada’s state-level policymaking associated with higher education
governance reform legislation.
Research Design
Creswell and Poth (2018) have suggested qualitative research can be used to help explain
the linkages in causal theories or models. Theories, they contend, “provide a general picture of
trends, associations, and relationships, but they do not tell us about the processes that people
experience, why they respond as they did, the context in which they responded, and their deeper
thoughts and behaviors that governed their responses” (p. 46). This qualitative case study sought
to explore the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors responded as they did
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and the context in which they responded. Specifically, the study’s purpose was to understand the
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework
of punctuated equilibrium theory.
Case study research involves in-depth data collection and analysis within a bounded
system (Creswell & Poth, 2018). My case study was bound within the confines of a single state,
Nevada, and between years 2000 to 2020, which widened the participant pool and enabled an
embedded analysis limited to three higher education governance reform bills unique in purpose
and design (i.e., AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5). Yin (2018) has contended an embedded case
study can help maintain a case study’s focus. Data collection included legislative documents,
audiovisual materials, media articles, and interviews. Informed by the document review, I used
purposeful sampling to recruit, via email, an initial group of policy actors and stakeholders to
interview, such as current and former legislators and higher education officials, associated with
AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5. Then I employed snowball sampling to identify additional
participants. I interviewed 12 individuals over a two-month period, and each interview generally
lasted between 30 to 35 minutes. Data analysis entailed a priori deductive codes and inductive
codes based on emergent themes in the data. I also used techniques of pattern matching (Yin,
2018) and constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to analyze the data. Ultimately,
multiple data sources from a review of documents and interviews with policy actors and
stakeholders served to triangulate findings and neutralize bias inherent in any one data source
(Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 2002).
Definitions
Listed below are terms and their definitions, which aid in understanding this study:
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Coordinating boards – state-level boards who have power to coordinate actions across a
higher education system. This power varies by state. Generally, “coordinating boards do not have
the authority to govern institutions…they do not have powers to grant degrees, establish
institutional policies, appoint institutional presidents/chancellors, and carry out other functions of
governing boards” (McGuinness, 2016a, p. 48).
Governance reform - “changes in structural and authority arrangement by state
government” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 58).
Governing boards – boards that “have legal management and control responsibilities for
a single institution or for a cluster of institutions called a multicampus or university system”
(Novak, 1996, p. 17)
Issue expanders - individuals who seek to dismantle policy monopolies by redefining
policy images in order to shift assignment of policy issues from one venue to another and expand
the conflict into the macropolitical arena (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).
Higher education governance - “the combination of governmental and institutional
structures responsible for postsecondary education in a state” (Wellman, 2006, p. 51).
Policy images - how policies are understood and discussed (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).
Policy entrepreneurs - advocates of policy change (Mintrom & Norman, 2009).
Policy venues - institutions or groups in society who have authority to make decisions
about policy issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).
Political entrepreneurs - influential members of government who advocate policy change
(Herweg, Zahariadis, & Zohlnhöfer, 2018).
Salami tactic - strategic manipulation of sequential decision-making (Zahariadis, 2003).
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Limitations
While a few policy scholars have argued against single-state case studies for their lack of
generalizability, others have contended it is “soundness of theory and rigor of analysis, rather
than the number of states, that makes research valid and important” (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier,
2002, p. 411). Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002) have also noted scholars of state policymaking
“should be interested in not only what happens across states, but also what happens within them”
(pp. 412-413). Ultimately, the application of policy theory to a single state like Nevada
facilitated a more complex, contextual understanding of the state’s legislative policymaking
process and provided support for the theoretical concepts of Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (1993,
2009) punctuated equilibrium theory.
Significance of the Study
Since McLendon (2003b) first reported a dearth of scholarship focusing on state-level
policymaking processes to reform higher education governance, few studies have sought to
address this gap (McLendon, 2003a; Mills, 2007; Tandberg & Anderson, 2012). These studies
similarly examined state-level policymaking that resulted in policy change (i.e., adoption of
higher education governance reform legislation). Like these three studies, this study sought to
contribute to McLendon’s call for research on state-level policymaking processes to reform
postsecondary governance. In contrast to these studies however, this study examined state-level
policymaking processes to reform higher education governance during periods of policy stasis,
rather than periods of policy change, by investigating the preservation of Nevada’s higher
education governance entity through the policy lens of punctuated equilibrium theory. Thus, this
research may offer useful information to state actors (e.g., governors, legislators, state agency
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officers, and governance boards) who either seek postsecondary governance reform or aim to
preserve the status quo.
Summary
Research has suggested Nevada is deficient in meeting its educated workforce needs.
Policy scholars (NCPPHE, 2005; Richardson, Bracco, Callan, & Finney, 1999) have contended
state higher education governance entities built for other times and other public purposes may
crowd out attention to urgent public priorities. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to
understand the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the
theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium theory. A study of Nevada’s state-level
policymaking process as it pertains to higher education governance reform legislation may
provide useful information to Nevada’s state policymakers as they seek to address their educated
workforce needs via postsecondary governance reform. While this chapter provided an overview
of relevant literature and briefly discussed the study purpose, research questions, theoretical
framework, research design, definitions, limitations, and the significance of the study, the next
chapter provides an extensive review of the literature and detailed examination of the theoretical
framework that guided this study.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Introduction
A review of postsecondary governance literature underscored the enduring role states
have played in facilitating higher education performance. It also illustrated how state financial
support and oversight and control of postsecondary education has often fluctuated since the
establishment of American colonial colleges as states have responded to changing societal and
economic demands. Governors, legislatures, State Higher Education Executive Officers, and
state-level governance structures have all shaped public higher education through financial,
policy and governance means. Ultimately, when it comes to state-level postsecondary
governance, the literature has suggested there is no one-size-fits-all model.
Three bodies of literature helped establish a framework for examining how the state of
Nevada’s legislative policymaking process has facilitated the preservation of its higher education
governance entity. The first group presented here offers a brief history of the role of states in
higher education. The second group examines state actors and their influence on postsecondary
education. Finally, the last body of literature addresses state-level governance structures and their
influence on higher education. In addition to the three sets of literature, a review of punctuated
equilibrium theory provides a policy lens from which to view and understand how the state of
Nevada’s legislative policymaking process has facilitated the preservation of its higher education
governance entity.
A Brief History: The Role of States in Higher Education
Historically, states have had a consequential and dynamic role in higher education, often
shifting their levels of financial support and oversight and control. In fact, the 10th Amendment
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to the U.S. Constitution has sanctioned the states’ role by deferring to them primary
responsibility for the development and maintenance of public education, including day-to-day
finance and governance of higher education (Hillman et al., 2015; McLendon & Ness, 2003).
Between 2017 and 2018, states’ financial support for postsecondary education grew by just
1.6%, appreciably down from a 4.2% increase in the previous year and the lowest annual growth
in the last five years (Seltzer, 2018). In terms of governance, some states, such as Nevada, North
Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia have recently sought legislation aimed at redesigning their
higher education governance structures (Fulton, 2019a). To be sure, the role of states in higher
education has fluctuated over the last 200 years. Thus, a brief historical examination of the role
of states in higher education is warranted.
In the eighteenth century, states acted as financiers of higher education, initially
providing public land grants and lottery authorizations, and later direct financial support from
general tax revenues, to mostly private, church-chartered institutions (Heller, 2004). With the
advent of public institutions in the nineteenth century, states expanded their financier role to
include both private and public universities (Heller, 2004). However, shortly after the 1819
landmark case of Dartmouth College in which the state of New Hampshire failed to gain control
of the state-chartered school, states ended nearly all appropriations to private institutions and
concentrated financial support on public universities (Heller, 2004). In return for the direct
subsidies states provided to public universities, state legislatures began claiming governance
control over these institutions by reserving the right to appoint trustees (Brubacher & Rudy,
1968). However, their control was limited since lay governing boards were responsible for
providing institutional oversight. Zumeta and Kinne (2011) have pointed out, early lay governing
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boards, which were often comprised of clergy and other community professionals, enabled a
“neat” balance between public accountability and institutional autonomy.
It was not until the enactment of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, which resulted in
the growth of state universities and normal schools, that state legislatures focused their attention
on the matter of how to govern these institutions (Heller, 2004). During this time frame and into
the twentieth century, states developed statewide or systemwide governing boards (Heller, 2004).
McGuinness (2016a) has noted that by the end of the second world war, 18 states had created
statewide bodies for governing higher education. According to McGuinness (2016a):
While the issues differed in each state, an underlying theme was a desire to eliminate
corruption, to modernize – and often centralize – state government and to counter the
centrifugal forces of local and regional politics. The expressed intent of several of the
changes was to curb what was perceived as counterproductive lobbying of the state
legislature for state funding, unnecessary duplication of academic programs and
activities, and, in some cases, political intrusion and corruption. (p. 6)
During this era, states continued their role of funding public universities, while governing boards
remained fairly autonomous (McGuinness, 2016a).
Post-World War II also marked the beginning of mass higher education as war veterans
flooded college campuses with the enactment of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944,
more commonly known as the federal GI Bill (History, n.d.). Nearly 49% of college admissions
in 1947 were veterans (History, n.d.). Overall, college enrollments increased over 60% from a
pre-war level of 1.5 million to 2.4 million by 1950 (McGuinness, 2016b). Additionally, the 1958
National Defense Education Act, passed in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of satellite
Sputnik and acceleration of the space race, bolstered federal investment in higher education by
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over a one million dollars over seven years (“National Defense,” n.d.). No longer was higher
education viewed as a private good purchased mainly by elites, rather it was seen as a societal
investment essential for supporting the nation’s veterans and “[training] manpower of sufficient
quality and quantity to meet the national defense needs of the United States” (“National
Defense,” n.d., para. 1). Consequently, as economic and political demands for higher education
grew, the role of states in higher education continued to expand as well.
From the 1950s into the 1970s, the role of states in higher education shifted from mostly
offering financial assistance to public institutions to actively building capacity in support of
opportunity and access (McGuinness, 2016a). With the enactment of the Higher Education Act
in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated, “Higher education is no longer a luxury, but a
necessity” (“Higher,” n.d., para. 1). The president also urged universities to help solve national
problems, such as community development and poverty (“Higher,” n.d.). New statewide
coordinating boards were essential to creating capacity through the development of master plans,
new academic programs, and funding methods for the distribution of resources across institutions
(McGuinness, 2016a). According to McGuinness (2016a), 23 states established statewide
coordinating boards. Overall, the trend during this era reflected centralized and consolidated
governance structures, which was driven by a need for public accountability of higher education
given the tremendous growth of college enrollments (McLendon & Ness, 2003). Some states
also believed centralized governance could enhance the analytical strength of state-level
decision-making and result in greater efficiencies across systems (McLendon & Ness, 2003).
On the contrary, there appeared to be no dominant trend in the role of states in higher
education governance during the 1980s and 1990s. McLendon (2003b) has found that states
considered over 100 legislative initiatives to reform their higher education governance systems
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between 1985 and 2000. Moreover, McLendon, Deaton, and Hearn (2007) have documented 22
cases of state-level higher education governance reform between 1980 and 2000. While some
states, such as Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Hawaii, and Oregon lessened their control through
decentralization and deregulation, other states, such as Alaska, Louisiana, Kansas, Kentucky, and
South Carolina expanded their oversight and control through centralization (McLendon & Ness,
2003). The role of states in higher education governance overall reflected “a variegated array of
state-level reform (sometimes referred to as ‘restructuring’) initiatives representing several
different patterns of activity, rather than one dominant movement” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 80).
McLendon and Ness (2003) have highlighted that:
As in the previous period, “accountability” remained a watchword of reform, but public
perceptions about how best to achieve accountability shifted during the 1980s and 1990s;
markets, rather than governments, became viewed as offering the surest mechanism for
achieving important state policy goals and for improving institutional quality,
effectiveness, and efficiency. (pp. 68-67)
Consequently, some states granted more autonomy to public institutions. However, other states
claimed greater control in an effort to enhance coordination, lower costs, or improve services
(McLendon & Ness, 2003). For example, McGuinness (1994) has indicated that from 1985 to
1989, Arkansas, Colorado, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington
strengthened their coordinating boards by providing more regulatory, master planning, or policy
leadership powers.
The trend of state financial support of public higher education during the 1980s and
1990s was one of decline (Thelin, 2011). In the 1990s, academic administrators often lamented,
“Once we were state supported. Then we were state assisted. Now we are state located” (Thelin,
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2004, p. 36). While some states, such as Virginia, funded their postsecondary institutions based
on funding received in the previous year, a few states implemented funding formulas based on
enrollment, costs, or a mix of the two (Hauptman, 2011). Despite the funding approach they
used, states had charted a path of declining appropriations for public higher education that would
continue well into the twenty-first century.
Today, nearly two decades into the twenty-first century, the role of states in higher
education remains in flux (see Appendix A for a summary of postsecondary reform). States face
a myriad of environmental pressures, such as limited state budgets and increased public demands
for higher education affordability and accountability. Research has suggested that America is
“losing ground in postsecondary education relative to our competitors...increasing our supply of
skilled labor is central to the vitality of the U.S. economy” (Carnevale & Rose, 2014, p. 13).
Consequently, states are attempting to address this challenge through governance reform and
policy means. For example, governors in California and Colorado are presently aiming to
strengthen their statewide coordinating boards (Toppo, 2019). According to the Education
Commission of the States, 35 governors in their 2019 State of the State Addresses featured their
plans to meet state economic needs through workforce development (Pompelia & MacDonald,
2019). In addition, 19 governors have proposed postsecondary financial aid policies to address
the need for more affordable higher education (Pompelia & MacDonald, 2019).
Societal demands to increase the number of college graduates, such as the Lumina
Foundation’s (2014) “Big Goal,” which challenges states to increase the percentage of
Americans with degrees and certificates to 60% by 2025, have further burdened states and
impacted their role in higher education. McGuinness (2016b) has suggested concerns about
restoring economic competitiveness since the Great Recession in 2008-2009, have driven some
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states to implement long-term public agenda goals. He has highlighted that a 2014 survey
conducted by the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems found 26 states
had indicated they had a statewide goal addressing postsecondary attainment of their citizens,
while 14 states had reported they did not have such a goal, and 10 states had suggested they were
in the process of establishing such a goal. As of 2019, the Lumina Foundation has reported 42
states have adopted attainment goals tied to expected workforce needs. In response to demands
to increase production of graduates, many states have also employed performance-based funding
methodologies. Hillman and Corral (2017) have reported that over the past decade, 21 states
have implemented performance-based funding by tying institutional funding to completion rates,
rather than enrollment numbers. To be sure, the pressures states have faced have shaped their
role in higher education. As Lyall (2013) has suggested states and their higher education systems
will likely continue to be subject to the necessity for change given the current environment.
Thus, whether by drift or by design, the role of states in higher education will remain influx
during the twenty-first century (Viggiani & Szczerbacki, 2015).
What follows in the next two sections of this chapter is an examination of state actors and
their influence on postsecondary education, along with a review of state governance structures to
include both coordinating and governing boards. In addition, a brief mention of institutional
governing boards is warranted since nearly 50% of all states do not have a single statewide
postsecondary governance entity, rather they employ a combination of system and institutional
boards to oversee higher education (Cooper & Rosser, 2018). Where appropriate, the state of
Nevada and its single statewide governance entity are offered as examples to enable comparisons
across states. Ultimately, an analysis of state actors and state higher education governance
entities suggests there is no one-size-fits-all model when it comes to postsecondary governance.

18

State Actors and Their Influence on Postsecondary Education
Any study of policymaking as it pertains to higher education governance reform requires
an understanding of postsecondary governance and an examination of the complex relationship
between state actors and higher education. In this study, higher education governance is defined
as “the combination of governmental and institutional structures responsible for postsecondary
education in a state” (Wellman, 2006, p. 51). Although the concept of shared governance is often
included in higher education governance discussions, it is not part of this analysis since emphasis
here is placed on state-level governance, rather than academic governance (see Mortimer &
Sathre, 2007 for information on academic governance). According to Wellman (2006), higher
education governance includes four main functions: “strategic planning and articulation of goals;
financing; public communication and accountability to different stakeholders; and selection and
performance review of management” (p. 51). Similar to McGuinness’ (2016a) outline of state
functions in higher education, Wellman (2006) has identified several mechanisms used in the
governance of higher education: “policy development, performance review, regulation, and
finance,” and she has suggested “finance” is the most influential governance mechanism (p. 51).
Scholars of higher education governance have contended “states invest in higher
education institutions…under the premise that such institutions will support the public policy
goals of the state” (Hendrickson et al., 2013, p. 113). They have further indicated academic
institutions must respond to the way state governments regulate and fund higher education
because state governments are crucial actors in changing economic environments (Hendrickson
et al., 2013). “The most successful public university leaders [and academic institutions],” they
have argued, “are often those who have built long-term relationships with government
officials…” (Hendrickson et al., 2013, p. 257). To be sure, the relationship between state
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governments and higher education is complex and essential. From governors, to legislatures, to
State Higher Education Executive Officers, multiple state actors influence governance of higher
education and share responsibility for higher education outcomes.
Governors
As heads of the executive branch of state government, governors can play an influential
role in the governance, policymaking, and finance of higher education (Hendrickson et al., 2013;
Hillman et al., 2015). When governors make higher education a top priority, they often advocate
for legislation and governance reform (Hendrickson et al., 2013). For instance, researchers have
found the governor of Massachusetts was the entrepreneur, or champion, in the state’s 1991
restructure of higher education governance (Tandberg & Anderson, 2012). Lingenfelter et al.
(2008) have asserted, “Governors have unmatched power to set an agenda for higher education
and to mobilize other political and civic leaders in pursuit of that agenda” (p. 8). They have
underscored that in many states, governors wield the most influence in allocating state funds and
in shaping tax policy, both of which may impact higher education. Besides approving state
appropriations for higher education, most governors have power to appoint some, if not all,
members of statewide governance boards, and some have authority to appoint members of
institutional governance boards (Cooper & Rosser, 2018). A few governors, such as the governor
of Montana, hold ex officio membership on state boards (“Montana,” n.d.). However, scholars
have suggested the authority of governors “to influence, sign or veto legislation, to set an agenda,
and to influence the budget” generally outweigh their powers of appointment (Lingenfelter et al.,
2008, p. 10). Several studies have reported the critical role of governors in state financing of
higher education (Ness & Tandberg, 2013; Tandberg & Ness, 2011) and in higher education
governance reform (McLendon, 2003b; McLendon et al., 2007).
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Despite the similarities in the role of governors across the 50 states, their individual
powers vary (Hendrickson et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 2015). Fowler (2000, p. 147) has pointed
out, “The strongest governors are elected to serve a four-year term and can be reelected at least
once, have the power to appoint numerous state officials, have considerable control over the state
budget and can veto legislation” (as cited in Hendrickson et al., 2013, p. 116). Beyle (2004) has
suggested governors possess two types of power: personal power and institutional power (as
cited in Hillman et al., 2015). Personal power, he has contended, is based on factors such as,
political ambition (i.e., path to office) and job performance as measured by public opinion (as
cited in Hillman et al., 2015). Similar to positional power (Northouse, 2013), Beyle (2004) has
argued institutional power includes factors often set by law, such as appointment authority, term
length, veto power, and the degree to which a governor’s party controls the legislature (as cited
in Hillman et al., 2015). While governors hold significant power, they are constrained by
constitutions, state economic conditions, the willingness of the people to follow and re-elect
them, length of office, and the political process (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). Likewise, legislatures
experience similar constraints.
Legislatures
Across the nation, state legislatures are key policy actors in higher education. According
to Lingenfelter et al. (2008), “They shape public policy for higher education in many ways,
including creating a demand for improvement, setting the terms of accountability, and deciding
how much money is provided and where it may be spent” (p. 9). From policies created to address
student financial aid and scholarships to transfer procedures and rules designed to ease the
transition of student veterans, state legislatures shape higher education in ways that often affect
students. Sometimes, they pass legislation that directly impacts the operations of universities and
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colleges, such as when they impose performance-based funding models and reorganize
governance bodies. Hendrickson et al. (2013) have articulated state legislatures’ “primary
entanglement usually occurs over state funding of higher education” (p. 114), and thus, “the most
influential [legislators] tend to be members of budget and higher education committees” (p. 115).
Although state legislatures share similar roles, they differ in their attributes. A few states
(i.e., 10 total), such as California and New York, have full-time legislatures, while most states,
like Nevada and Arizona, have part-time legislatures (Ballotpedia, n.d.). In Nevada specifically,
the legislature meets biennially for 120 days. Generally, full-time legislatures meet throughout
the year, have larger staffs, and earn higher salaries than part-time legislatures (Ballotpedia,
n.d.). A 2014 National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) survey of all state legislators
found full-time legislators spent 84% of a full-time job equivalent on legislative work and
received an estimated average annual compensation of $82,000, whereas part-time legislators
spent between 57% and 74% of a full-time job equivalent on legislative work and received an
estimated annual compensation between $18,000 and $41,000 (NCSL, n.d.a). Theoretically, fulltime legislators are likely more engaged in shaping their states’ higher education system.
However, Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have suggested, “legislators [like governors] are constrained
by the breadth of their responsibilities” and consequently, they cannot “sustain deep involvement
in any single area, and it is very difficult for them to concentrate their powers on a single issue”
(p. 9). Thus, whether full- or part-time, legislators may expend appreciable legislative time and
resources addressing non-higher education issues, such as those related to economic and social
programs.
Scholars have indicated partisanship (e.g., party control and party representation) is
another dimension from which to view state legislatures (Hillman et al., 2015). When a political
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party holds the majority in both chambers, that party has legislative control (NSCL, n.d.b). When
a party holds both chambers and the governorship, as the Democratic Party currently does in
Nevada, that party has state control (NCSL, n.d.b). As of 2019, the Republican Party has
legislative control in 30 states and state control in 22 states, while the Democratic Party has
legislative control in 18 states and state control in 14 states (“State and Legislative,” 2019). In
one state (Minnesota), legislative control is divided since neither party holds both chambers;
similarly, state control is divided in 13 states (“State and Legislative,” 2019). Nebraska is unique
in its unicameral status and members are elected on a nonpartisan bases (“State and Legislative,”
2019). Tandberg (2013) has observed that several studies have found democratic governors [and
legislatures] to be more generous in financing higher education (Archibald & Feldman, 2006;
McLendon, Hearn, & Mokher, 2009; Tandberg, 2008, 2010a, 2010b).
State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEOs)
All states have a minimum of one central administrative entity led by SHEEOs (Hillman
et al., 2015). Generally, SHEEOs are responsible to help ensure accountability in public higher
education and are obligated to the postsecondary institutions in their states (Hillman et al., 2015).
Glenny (1959), an early education scholar who held a statewide perspective on higher education
(Lingenfelter, 2012), has purported SHEEOs act as secretaries, staff directors, and chief initiators
of policy recommendations (as cited in Hillman et al., 2015). More recently, Lingenfelter et al.
(2008) have indicated the duties of SHEEOs largely include:
(a) advising governors and legislators on higher education policy; (b) making
recommendations to the state with respect to the allocation of resources; (c) overseeing
regulatory systems designed to promote quality in the academic offerings of constituent
campuses; (d) administering state grant programs to students or institutions; and (e)
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collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and sharing data and information. (as cited in
Tandberg, Fowles, & McLendon, 2017, p. 112)
Tandberg et al. (2017) have highlighted that SHEEOs’ responsibilities and how they are
appointed varies across states. For example, in Nevada, elected regents of the single statewide
governing board hire and fire the system chancellor who also serves as the SHEEO (“NSHE
Overview,” n.d.). In Colorado, the governor appoints and fires the SHEEO (“Colorado,” n.d.).
Tandberg et al. (2017) have suggested “the formal institutional arrangements that tie the SHEEO
to the governor (in this case, gubernatorial appointment and dismissal powers) may matter more
than the formal authority granted to the SHEEO (in this case, the SHEEO’s budgetary
recommendation powers)” (p. 126). Based on an analysis of state-level panel data which entailed
“1,225 observations, done in 49 states, each of which [was] observed annually from 1985 to
2009” (p. 117), Tandberg et al. (2017) found that “when [governors appoint SHEEOs], increased
spending appears to result, all things equal; but when [governors are] able to dismiss [SHEEOs],
decreased spending appears to result, again, all things equal” (p. 124). Tandberg and his
colleagues have suggested their results imply SHEEOs are institutional actors in the higher
education budgetary process, but the potential role they play may be partially set by the
institutional relationship between SHEEOs and governors. To be sure, SHEEOs like state-level
governance structures, reside at the intersection between state governments and higher education,
and therefore, they may often find themselves maneuvering between public policy and politics to
be effective (Wellman, 2006).
State-Level Governance Structures and Their Influence on Higher Education
All states have at least one board that is responsible for the governance of public
universities and colleges (McGuinness, 2016b). However, most states have multiple boards, and
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they vary in their level of oversight (i.e., statewide, system, and institutional). For example, in
Nevada and North Dakota a single statewide board overseas all public postsecondary institutions,
while in California three separate boards oversee the University of California system, California
State University and Colleges, and the community colleges (ECS, 2019). Board members,
commonly known as regents, trustees, or directors, are mostly comprised of university outsiders,
such as business professionals, lawyers, and doctors (Eckel, 2019). Board membership generally
ranges from 8 to 17 members. In most states, members are appointed by the governor, however,
in some states, board members may serve by virtue of their position. Only in Nevada are all 13
governing regents at the statewide level elected by the public. Hendrickson et al. (2013) have
contended, “Elected members may wield more political influence and have a greater opportunity
to challenge unfriendly politicians and institutional leaders” (p. 121) versus board members who
are appointed. However, analysts, like Richard Novak, former executive director of the Center
for Public Trusteeship and Governance at the Association of Governing Boards of Universities
and Colleges, have noted, “Appointed boards tend to have a broader view of the world" and “if
[governors take] care, [appointed boards] tend to be more effective [than elected boards]”
(Hebel, 2004, para. 5). Finally, the source of authority for boards can be constitutional or
statutory. For instance, governance boards in Alaska, Hawaii, and Nevada derive their authority
from their states’ constitution, while boards in Arkansas and Colorado gain authority via enacted
laws. Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) have found higher education boards whose source of
legal authority is derived from statutes are “associated with 8% greater total costs per student,
14% higher tuition, and 6% lower state appropriations but compliment that with a 58% greater
allocation of financial aid” (p. 94).
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Generally, there are two types of centralized state-level higher education governance
structures: coordinating boards and governing boards (Hendrickson et al., 2013; Novak, 1996;
Parmley, Bell, L'Orange, & Lingenfelter, 2009). Whether coordinating or governing, most of
these boards “are designed to provide a “built-in” connection of business and civic leaders to the
higher education public policy dialogue, and to provide a permanent forum for higher education
policy that is partially insulated from the give and take and discontinuities of the partisan
political process” (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 6). According to Hillman et al. (2015), several
studies have shown postsecondary governance structures can affect state policy behavior, such as
the types of policies adopted and state financing of higher education (Doyle, 2006; Tandberg,
2010a, 2013). Moreover, McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006) have argued, “Governance…
‘matters’ because organizational and authority structures help determine whose interests will
prevail” (p. 19). Recently, Cooper and Rosser (2018) have found among the 50 states, 20 states
employed statewide coordinating boards, 8 states had single statewide governing boards, and 22
states did not have a single statewide postsecondary governance entity rather they employed
system and institutional boards to govern public higher education (see Appendix B).
Statewide Coordinating Boards
Statewide coordinating boards largely play a role in planning and financing public higher
education at the state and system level, rather than the institutional level (McGuinness, 2015;
Parmley et al., 2009). For instance, coordinating boards may develop funding formulas to
allocate state appropriations, but they do not provide direct input on individual institutional
budgets (McGuinness, 2016a). According to Hendrickson et al. (2013), coordinating boards are
“meant to ensure collaboration among the state’s educational institutions and ensure those
institutions operate in a way that is aligned with state priorities and is in the best interest of the
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public” (p. 119). Consequently, effective coordinating boards are able to work “in the center of a
triangle consisting of…the governor, the legislature, and the higher education community”
(Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 8). Ultimately, the strength of statewide coordinating boards lies in
their “ability to focus on broad public policy issues and to devote considerable attention to the
data and information required to advise the elected leaders responsible for making policy and
allocating public resources” (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 8). However, their limited authority
may diminish their effectiveness unless they are supported by formal statutes and dynamic
relationships (Lingenfelter et al., 2008).
Statewide Governing Boards
Unlike coordinating boards whose authority is restricted, statewide governing boards
have operational authority over public postsecondary institutions (Hendrickson et al., 2013).
Their responsibilities usually entail personnel decisions, institutional operations, and corporate
governance (Parmley et al., 2009). With a single “chain of command” from statewide governing
boards to institutional presidents, governing boards hire, evaluate, and can fire university and
college presidents (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 8). They also maintain fiduciary responsibilities
and ensure postsecondary institutions execute their missions (Kezar, 2006). Some statewide
governing boards, like Nevada’s single statewide governing board, have strong executive
leaders, or chancellors, who play a “significant [role] in developing system strategy, allocating
resources, and evaluating the performance of institutional chief executives” (Parmley et al.,
2009, p. 2). Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have suggested where no strong executive exists, statewide
governing boards have emphasized institutional issues over statewide agendas.
To be effective, governing boards “need the governor’s ear” (Kezar, 2006, p. 992).
Moreover, they must be able to determine how to best allocate resources across multiple
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institutions and balance institutional needs (Hendrickson et al., 2013). A fundamental
responsibility of state governing boards is to oversee the balance between public accountability
and institutional autonomy (McGuinness, 2016b). This can be challenging. “Boards are often
criticized for residing in one of two camps – perceived as either too close to the governor or
appointing authority, or too close to the university administration, and many are unable to
balance successfully the interests of the public and the state with those of the institution or
university system” (Lingenfelter et al., 2008, p. 13). Effective statewide governing boards are
able to focus on state priorities in concert with institutional aspirations (Lingenfelter et al., 2008).
As of 2018, Nevada and seven other states use statewide governing boards to oversee all
public postsecondary institutions (Cooper & Rosser, 2018). While governing boards in Alaska,
Hawai’i, Nevada, and North Dakota are quite similar to each other in their source of authority,
composition, and number of institutions they oversee, the remaining four statewide governing
boards in Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Rhode Island have nuances, which make them uniquely
different (McGuinness, 2016a, pp. 46-47). For example, statewide governing boards in Idaho and
Rhode Island oversee K-12 and higher education. In Kansas and Montana, the Board of Regents
govern universities and coordinate community colleges. Regardless of the differences among
these eight boards, generally speaking, statewide governing boards are associated with greater
state control and less institutional autonomy. Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have highlighted most
institutional leaders under statewide governing structures would prefer to have their own
institutional governing board and the potential autonomy that comes along with it.
Institutional Governing Boards
Members of institutional governing boards share similar duties to those of statewide
governing boards, such as hiring and firing presidents, budgeting, and executing the mission
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(Mortimer & Sathre, 2007). Additionally, they generally strive to balance institutional aspirations
with state priorities. Freedman (2004) has asserted that institutional governing boards must
clearly establish principles to guide institutions’ educational aspirations. Ultimately, the political
environment in which public universities and colleges exist demands institutional boards and
presidents nurture strong relationships with governors and legislators since these state actors
provide policy oversight and institutional funding via state appropriations (Freedman, 2004).
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
Grounded in evolutionary biology, punctuated equilibrium theory provides a framework
to understand the public policymaking process during times of stasis and change (Baumgartner
& Jones, 1993, 2009). As Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have acknowledged, the phrase,
punctuated equilibrium, was coined by paleontologists, Eldredge and Gould (1972), “to describe
gaps in the evolutionary record” (p. 19). Similarly, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have used
punctuated equilibrium to describe the policymaking process because it elicits images of stability
interrupted by large alterations to a system, which they have argued is how policymaking occurs.
Punctuated equilibrium theory contends the policymaking process is defined by long
periods of stability and incremental policy change. Occasionally, the process is marked by major
policy change as policy images are redefined and policy issues shift from monopolistic policy
venues, or policy subsystems, into the larger macropolitical arena. During periods of equilibrium,
policymaking takes place away from the public eye within individual subsystems comprised of
bureaucratic experts and interest groups. In times of dramatic policy change, however,
policymaking moves beyond policy subsystems and often occurs under heightened public and
media attention. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have argued the mechanisms of issue definition
and agenda control and access are essential to understanding fluctuations between periods of
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stability and change in policymaking. Two core elements of punctuated equilibrium theory—
policy images and policy venues—underscore the role of issue definition and agenda control and
access in the policymaking process. A closer analysis of these elements and their relationship to
each other clarifies the public policymaking process from a theoretical lens of punctuated
equilibrium. In addition, a review of research that has used punctuated equilibrium theory as a
guiding framework helps inform the current study.
Policy Images
According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009), “how a policy is understood and discussed
is its policy image” (p. 25). Policy images reflect how policy problems or issues are defined. In
this study, I use the terms “policy images” and “problem/issue definitions” interchangeably.
Policy images entail both empirical and affective (e.g., evaluative) components (Baumgartner &
Jones, 2009). Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have equated the evaluative component to tone.
Tone, they have suggested, is vital to issue development “because rapid changes in the tone of
policy [images] held by social actors (such as the mass media) often presages changes in patterns
of mobilization” (p. 26). Rochefort and Cobb (1994) have suggested problem definitions, like
policy images, refer to the way policy issues are presented and discussed, and they serve “to
explain, to describe, to recommend, and, above all, to persuade” (p.15). Ultimately, Baumgartner
and Jones (2009) have argued “issue definition…is the driving force in both stability and
instability, primarily because issue definition has the potential for mobilizing the disinterested”
(p. 16). Thus, policy actors seek to control issue definitions or policy images as a way to either
create policy change, or maintain stability in the policymaking process.
Problem definitions rarely consist of more than a single dimension of an issue at any
given time (Rochefurt & Cobb, 1994). To be sure, problem definitions are never value neutral,
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rather they reflect the beliefs, principles, and political views of the institutions or groups who
have decision-making authority over the policy issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Rochefurt &
Cobb, 1994). Rochefurt and Cobb (1994) have noted “the way [problems are] defined invariably
entails some statement about [their] origins” (p. 15). For example, proposed higher education
governance reform legislation presented as problems of accountability or economics are likely
introduced by state authorities while reform legislation characterized as issues of institutional
autonomy and effectiveness suggests origins of postsecondary institutions and institutional
trustees. Seidman and Rappaport (1986) have contended, “the definition of a social problem is
[also] time, place, and context bound” (p. 1). Consequently, policy images may change over time
as policy actors and decision-makers strategically seek to influence the policymaking process.
Policy Venues
Policy venues are the institutions or groups in society who have authority to make
decisions about policy issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Thus, venues are mechanisms for
controlling and accessing policy agendas. Venues may include federal and state agencies, local
authorities, special interest groups, and various other institutions (McLendon, 2003b). Venues
that involve governments are known as policy subsystems (McLendon, 2003b). Policy
subsystems are “characterized by the lack of interference by broader political forces, which defer
to the judgement of experts” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 108). Mostly comprised of issue specialists
in government bureaucracies and interest groups, policy subsystems generally work behind
closed doors away from public view (McLendon, 2003b).
According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009), policy venues may be monopolistic or
shared. Thus, one institution may have sole decision-making authority over a policy issue, or
several groups may share jurisdiction of the issue (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). “History,
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constitutional arrangements, cultural understandings, and the performance of institutions on
similar issues in the past all affect the current assignment of issues to institutions” (Baumgartner
& Jones, 2009, p. 33). Additionally, just as policy images may sometimes shift, so too may
policy venues (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). For example, the U.S. constitution has deferred the
education policy domain to states, although the federal government has been involved at times.
Generally, in higher education, some policy issue decisions are made by governors, some
by legislators, some by boards of trustees and State Higher Education Executive Officers, some
at the institutional level, and occasionally, some by the public. Baumgartner and Jones (2009)
have suggested “difference in issue assignment create differences in policy, as different groups
are favored or disadvantaged by different institutional arrangements” (p. 32). Moreover, various
policy venues may have contrasting and opposing policy images of the same issue (Baumgartner
& Jones, 2009). For example, state legislators may view increasing tuition rates as an issue of
student affordability and access to higher education while postsecondary administrators may see
tuition hikes as a source of revenue needed to offset declining state appropriations. As the saying
goes, how one sees an issue is often determined by where one sits. To be sure, policy venues
combined with policy images may significantly impact the policymaking process during periods
of policy stability and change.
Relationship Between Policy Images and Policy Venues
In times of stasis, policy change is usually incremental. Stability is reinforced through
noninterfering policy monopolies and dominant supporting policy images (Baumgartner &
Jones, 2009). McLendon (2003b) has suggested policy actors across all venues have an interest
in creating and sustaining monopolies. Policy monopolies share two features: “a definable
institutional structure is responsible for policymaking and that structure can limit access to the
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policy process [and] a powerful supporting idea is associated with the institution” (Baumgartner
& Jones, 2009, p. 7).
Policy subsystems are ideal for facilitating the creation of policy monopolies. Within the
institutional boundaries of policy subsystems, policymaking remains relatively stable because
participating bureaucratic issue specialists often share similar values across issues (Baumgartner
& Jones, 2009). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, 1999) likens such values to policy core
beliefs, which represent both normative and empirical beliefs across a policy domain. Policy
subsystem actors are also naturally conservative in changing rules of decision-making because
they understand adjusting rules and procedures may disrupt the status quo and result in
unintended consequences (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Likewise, they control access to the
policy agenda by limiting policy issues to a single dimension in which they are the experts
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Consequently, policymaking stays within the confines of policy
subsystems and stability is maintained over long periods of time. However, subsystems are not
fully protected from change; policy monopolies can be broken up (McLendon, 2003b).
Riker (1982) has suggested policy actors may destabilize the policymaking process by
presenting new dimensions of policy images, thus expanding policy issues beyond current policy
venues or subsystems (as cited in Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 14). In other words, “if people
outside the policy subsystem can be convinced that the policy in question has impacts beyond the
existing set of participants, they can be brought into the conflict” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009,
p. 19). According to Redford (1969), when political policy actors, such as the U.S. president and
congressional committee leaders, are brought into the process, the level of policy attention is
referred to as “macropolitics” to set it apart from “subsystem politics” or individual political
behavior (as cited in Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 21). Similarly, when governors and
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legislative committee members are brought into the higher education policymaking process, the
level of attention expands beyond the institutional or trustee subsystem levels into the larger
macropolitical arena. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have contended that the strategic movement
of policy issues into larger macropolitical policy arenas “is simply an extension of the process of
creation, destruction, and failure of policy monopolies” (p. 21).
Issue expanders often seek to dismantle policy monopolies by redefining policy images
in order to shift assignment of policy issues from one venue to another and expand the conflict
into the macropolitical arena (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Similarly, Kingdon (1984, 2003) has
suggested policy entrepreneurs or advocates, “hook solutions to problems, proposals to political
momentum, and political events to policy problems” (p. 180) in order to promote their policy
positions and limit or expand access to the policy agenda. The media may also influence policy
agenda access. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have suggested when there is elevated media
attention on a specific issue, there is often some level of policy change. To be sure, “policy
consequences of agenda access can be dramatic” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, p. 20). Together,
policy images and policy venues, facilitate policy shifts between stability and change and thus,
serve to explain punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).
Previous Research Using Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
As McLendon (2003b) has highlighted, Kelly (1994) observed other researchers had
previously applied a punctuated change model to study American political institutions (see
Burnham, 1970; Clubb, Flanagan, & Zingale, 1980; Huntington, 1981; Mayhew, 1991; and
Sundquist, 1983). However, Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2009) have pointed out their research
unified the macropolitical arena-policy subsystem dynamic (Redford, 1969) with studies of
agenda setting and conflict expansion (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; Schattschneider,
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1960) to explain both stability and change in public policymaking. Specifically, their study
traced the paths of seven U.S. policy issues over an extended period of time—nuclear power,
pesticides, drug and alcohol abuse, smoking and tobacco, automobile safety, urban policy, and
child abuse—to explain elements of stability and causes of change in policymaking.
Since Baumgartner’s and Jones’ initial work, numerous international policy researchers
have applied punctuated equilibrium theory to their own countries, extending the theory’s
applicability beyond American public policymaking (Baumgartner, Jones, & Mortenson, 2018).
Additionally, Baumgartner et al. (2018) have reported that within the U.S., both qualitative and
quantitative studies have used punctuated equilibrium theory to examine environmental policy
(Busenberg, 2004; Repetto, 2006; Salka, 2004; Wood, 2006), firearms control (True & Utter,
2002), regulatory drug review (Ceccoli, 2003), regulation of state hospital rates (McDonough,
1998), and education (Manna, 2006; McLendon, 2003c; Mulholland & Shakespeare, 2005;
Robinson, 2004). Moreover, they have contended these studies provide strong evidence that
punctuated equilibrium appears to be a key aspect of U.S. policymaking.
McLendon (2003b) has suggested punctuated equilibrium theory is a relevant policy
framework to study higher education governance reform. He has recommended researchers focus
on four interdependent concepts:
(1) the functioning of policy subsystems of issue specialists which routinely make higher
education governance policy; (2) the ways in which policy images create and sustain
monopolistic control over governance issues by a particular subsystem; (3) policy
entrepreneurs' strategic use of issue-redefinition to mobilize previously disinterested
parties, thus expanding conflict to new policy venues; and (4) the "punctuation" which is
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theorized to occur when shifting images and venues permit macropolitical institutions to
intervene into governance policymaking. (p. 122)
According to McLendon (2003b), a punctuated equilibrium approach to the study of higher
education governance reform should reveal policymaking marked by periods of stability and
change. Despite McLendon’s endorsement, peer-reviewed research that integrates state-level
higher education governance reform with punctuated equilibrium theory remains rather limited
(McLendon, 2003c; Mills, 2007; Tandberg & Anderson, 2012; Van Der Slik, 2001). Thus, the
current study aimed to fill that gap. Specifically, this study primarily sought to explain elements
of stability in state legislative policymaking as it related to higher education governance reform
in Nevada, thus acknowledging McLendon’s first two concepts. The third and fourth concepts
were relevant as well since the study compared similarities and differences between the ongoing
policymaking process of Assembly Joint Resolution 5, and the historical policymaking processes
of higher education governance reform initiatives that were not passed (i.e., Assembly Joint
Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331). Thus, punctuated equilibrium theory provided a sound
theoretical framework for the current study.
Summary
Historically, states have had a dynamic role in higher education. Today, nearly two
decades into the twenty-first century, the role of states in postsecondary education has remained
in flux as state actors respond to increasing economic and public demands for higher education
accountability and affordability. While states have often used policy and financial levers to
advance societal goals and priorities, they have also opted to reform their state-level
postsecondary governance entity. This qualitative case study sought to understand the
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework
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of punctuated equilibrium theory. Punctuated equilibrium theory has been well-suited to examine
state-level higher education governance reform because it can address both stability and change
in policymaking (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993, 2009). Next, Chapter 3 addresses the study
methodology.
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Chapter 3
Methods
Introduction
As noted in Chapter 2, a review of the literature has suggested a gap exists in
understanding state-level legislative policymaking associated with higher education governance
reform. In addition, some scholars have called for an expansion of policy-relevant higher
education research (Hillman et al., 2015; McLendon, 2003c). Thus, this study has sought to
address these deficiencies. Specifically, the purpose of this qualitative case study was to
understand the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the
theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium theory. The primary research question guiding
this study was: How has the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process facilitated the
preservation of the statewide higher education governance entity? A secondary question asked:
How is the legislative policymaking process of the ongoing higher education governance reform
bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or different from the process that addressed
Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, two former higher education governance
reform bills that were not passed?
This chapter is comprised of seven sections. In the first section I provide an overview of
the study’s research design. Then, I describe the case site to include a brief history of Nevada’s
higher education and postsecondary governance reform legislation. In the third section, I define
the case selection criteria, followed by a description of the data collection procedures. Next, I
address data analysis. In the final two sections, I explain my approach to establishing a
trustworthy study and address human subjects and ethical considerations, respectively.
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Research Design
Creswell and Poth (2018) have suggested qualitative research can be used to help explain
the linkages in causal theories or models. Theories, they contend, “provide a general picture of
trends, associations, and relationships, but they do not tell us about the processes that people
experience, why they respond as they did, the context in which they responded, and their deeper
thoughts and behaviors that governed their responses” (p. 46). This qualitative case study sought
to explore the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors responded as they did
and the context in which they responded. Specifically, the study’s purpose was to understand the
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework
of punctuated equilibrium theory.
Case Study
Case study design is appropriate since this study focused on a contemporary phenomenon
of interest within its real-life context (Yin, 2018). Case study is also well-suited for research
questions that ask “how” and “why” about a phenomenon of interest (Yin, 2018). The primary
research question guiding this study was: How has the state of Nevada’s legislative
policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education governance
entity? A secondary question asked: How is the legislative policymaking process of the ongoing
higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or different
from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, two
former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?
While a few policy scholars have argued against single-state case studies for their lack of
generalizability, others have contended it is “soundness of theory and rigor of analysis, rather
than the number of states, that makes research valid and important” (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier,
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2002, p. 411). Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002) have also noted scholars of state policymaking
“should be interested in not only what happens across states, but also what happens within them”
(pp. 412-413). Ultimately, the application of policy theory to a single state like Nevada
facilitated a more complex, contextual understanding of the state’s legislative policymaking
process and provided support for the theoretical concepts of Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (1993,
2009) punctuated equilibrium theory.
Case Site
Creswell (2016) has underscored the value of starting with a broad picture of the case site
and then narrowing it to create a contextual understanding of the case. In this section, I first
provide a brief history of Nevada’s public higher education system. Next, I outline the state-level
postsecondary governance entity that exists today. I conclude with a condensed summary of
Nevada’s historical higher education governance reform legislation.
Brief History of Public Higher Education in Nevada
The state of Nevada entered the Union as the 36th state on October 31st, 1864, during the
civil war, hence the nickname, “Battle Born” (“Nevada State Nicknames,” n.d.). In less than
three years, Nevada had transitioned from territory to statehood faster than any of its western
counterparts (McAffee & McAffee, 2014). McAffee and McAffee (2014) have highlighted:
The adopted state constitution placed almost unique emphasis on, and provided an entire
article of the constitution governing, the subject of education. Education was bound to be
a central area of attention, given the enactment of the Morrill Act of 1862, which required
specific areas of instruction in public universities if states were to qualify for federal
financial assistance. (p. 833)
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Specifically, Article 11, Section 4, established “a State University which shall embrace
departments for Agriculture, Mechanic Arts, and Mining to be controlled by a Board of Regents
whose duties shall be prescribed by law.”
In 1874, ten years post-statehood, the University of Nevada (now University of Nevada,
Reno, UNR) opened in Elko (Greenhaw, 1997). “The “State University,” as Elko residents called
it, rarely enrolled more than 30 students, a few of whom might have qualified for high school
admission, if a high school had existed” (Greenhaw, 1997, p. 90). Nevada’s population in 1880
was just over 62,000 people (“Nevada History,” n.d.). In 1886, the University of Nevada moved
to Reno (Greenhaw, 1997). Nearly 70 years later in 1957, what is now known as the University
of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV), was first established as the Southern Regional Division of the
University of Nevada (Damore, Lang, Nasoz, Brown, & Saladino, 2017). The legislature gave
the southern campus autonomy and a new name in 1965: Nevada Southern University (Damore
et al., 2017). By 1969, “UNLV,” along with the Desert Research Institute (DRI,) which had also
originated as a division of the northern university, were granted equal status with UNR by the
legislature (Damore et al., 2017; “DRI,” n.d.). These three institutions remain today, and in 2018,
the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education designated both, UNLV and
UNR, “R1: Doctoral Universities – Very high research activity.”
Unlike its rapid transition into statehood, Nevada was one of the last states to establish
community colleges (Greenhaw, 1997). The first community college (now Great Basin College)
opened in Elko in 1967 under the 22nd Republican Governor Paul Laxalt (“Nevada History,”
n.d.). Nevada’s three other community colleges were established in 1971 under Democrat
Governor Mike O’Callaghan (“Nevada History,” n.d.): College of Southern Nevada, Truckee
Meadows Community College, and Western Nevada College. (“NSHE Institutions,” n.d.).
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To help the Board of Regents oversee Nevada’s public higher education universities and
colleges, the legislature created the University and Community College System of Nevada
(UCCSN) in 1967 (“The Nevada Registry,” n.d.). UCCSN was renamed the Nevada System of
Higher Education (NSHE) in 2005, the same year Nevada State College was established (“NSHE
Institutions,” n.d.). According to legal analysts, Powers (2014) and McAffee and McAffee
(2014), NSHE acts as a state agency to provide administrative support for the Board of Regents
(as cited in Martinez, 2014). Today, Nevada’s public higher education system, comprised of two
research universities, one state college, four community colleges, and DRI, provides educational
opportunities to over 100,000 students combined (“NSHE News,” 2019).
Nevada’s Postsecondary Governance Entity
The “Board of Regents of the State University” consists of 13 publicly-elected members
who have constitutional authority to “govern” the Nevada System of Higher Education (“NSHE
Overview,” n.d.). This is unlike all other “statewide” governing and coordinating boards whose
members are mostly appointed by governors or selected based on their official position. Election
years vary across 13 state districts to ensure overlap and continuity of board members (NRS
396.040, n.d.). Only when a board vacancy occurs does the governor step in to appoint a
replacement to serve until the next succeeding general election (NRS 396.060, n.d.). Regents
serve a six-year term (Bowers, 2013). Like most governing boards, Nevada’s Board of Regents
are responsible for setting policy, approving budgets, and hiring/firing of the institutions’
presidents. The regents also appoint the chancellor, who serves as the chief executive officer
(CEO) for NSHE and as the SHEEO. As CEO, the chancellor supervises the eight institutional
presidents and ensures board policies are implemented across the public higher education system
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(“NSHE Overview,” n.d.). Additionally, the chancellor serves as NSHE’s liaison to the governor,
state legislators, and other public officials and community leaders (“NSHE Overview,” n.d.).
Summary of Nevada’s Higher Education Governance Reform Legislation
Throughout its 156-year history, the state of Nevada has maintained its single state-level
higher education governance system largely intact since its creation in 1864. While the
legislature has marginally adjusted the number of regents and their term limits, they have not
enacted legislation that reforms the higher education governance structure or changes its
authority arrangement. Consequently, Nevada’s single state-level postsecondary governance
structure exists today as it did in 1864. Periodically, however, public debate and legislative
proposals have centered on the way members of the Board of Regents are selected and their
powers and duties (Stonefield, 2003). Past debates have also focused on the role of public higher
education in Nevada’s overall economic and societal well-being (Stonefield, 2003).
Since 1957, at least 15 joint resolutions to change the Board of Regents by amending
Article 11 (Education) of the Nevada Constitution have been introduced in the legislature (see
Stonefield, 2003, for details about resolutions entered between 1957 to 2000). Most resolutions
have called for the “appointment” of some regents. Some have proposed a separate board for
community colleges. Most recently, Assembly Joint Resolution 5 has sought to remove the
Board of Regents from the constitution, making it a statutory body rather than a constitutional
entity (see Appendix C for summary of joint resolutions to change Nevada Board of Regents).
With the exception of Assembly Joint Resolution 5, which is still in progress, all governance
reform initiatives to amend Nevada’s Education Article 11 have failed. Thus, Nevada’s single
state-level higher education governance entity, like the hardy Nevada sagebrush, largely exists
today as it did in 1864.
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Case Selection Criteria
Creswell and Poth (2018) have indicated case study research involves detailed, in-depth
data collection and analysis within a bounded system. My case study was bound within the
confines of a single state, Nevada, and between the years 2000 to 2020. Yin (2018) has argued
the single-case study design is justifiable when a case represents an “extreme or unusual
circumstance” (p. 53). I focused on Nevada because it represented an unusual case in that it has
not substantially changed its higher education governance entity since it was established in 1864,
which is unlike many other states who have reformed their governance structures over time. My
rationale for the twenty-year time span was that it allowed me to address three different higher
education governance reform bills and widened my access to policy actors and stakeholders who
were directly involved in the legislative policymaking process in Nevada. For this study, higher
education governance reform referred to “changes in structural and authority arrangement by
state government” (McLendon, 2003b, p. 58). According to Yin (2018), an analysis limited to
three higher education governance reform bills rather than an analysis of all higher education
governance reform bills in Nevada, classified my research as an “embedded” single-case study
versus a “holistic” single-case study. Such an approach, Yin (2018) has contended, “can serve as
an important device for maintaining a case study’s focus” (p. 53). Next, I briefly describe the
three higher education governance reform bills that center my research study.
Assembly Joint Resolution (AJR) 11
AJR 11 was introduced during the 72nd Legislative Session (2003) by former
Assemblywoman Christina Giunchigliani (Democratic Party). It “[proposed] to amend the
Nevada Constitution to provide for the election of certain members of the Board of Regents and
the gubernatorial appointment of certain members of the Board of Regents, and to specify the
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number and terms of the members” (p. 1). Twice amended, it passed both the Nevada Assembly
and Senate and returned to the Nevada legislature in 2005 during the 73rd Legislative Session.
Once again it passed both houses, however, in 2006, by a margin of over 7,300 votes (269,807 in
favor, 277,174 opposed) Ballot Question No. 9 failed to win voter approval, and AJR 11 died
(“Nevada Statewide Ballot Questions,” 2006).
Assembly Bill (AB) 331
AB 331, officially titled, “Creates the Nevada System of Community Colleges. (BDR 3428),” was proposed during the 79th Legislative Session (2017) by former Assemblyman Ira
Hansen (Republican Party). Had this bill passed it would have accomplished the following:
“Effective July 1, 2018, this bill generally transfers authority for the supervision and control of
community colleges from the Board of Regents to the State Board for Community Colleges and
the boards of trustees of such community colleges” (p. 2). AB 331 died in the Assembly in 2017.
AJR 5
AJR5 was introduced in the 79th Legislative Session (2017) by former Assemblyman
Elliot Anderson and Senator Joyce Woodhouse (both Democratic Party). AJR 5, or the Nevada
Higher Education Reform, Accountability and Oversight Amendment, currently proposes to
“amend the Nevada Constitution to remove the constitutional provisions governing the election
and duties of the Board of Regents of the State University and to authorize the Legislature to
provide by statute for the governance, control and management of the State University and for
the reasonable protection of individual academic freedom” (p. 1). In Nevada, a constitutional
change is a five-year process; the legislature must approve the change in two consecutive
biennial sessions and then the public must approve it via a ballot measure. Consequently, AJR 5
is still under consideration. The legislature passed AJR 5 in 79th (2017) and 80th (2019)
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Legislative Sessions. The public will have final say on the amendment when they vote on it as a
ballot question in November 2020.
Data Collection Procedures
Case study methodology relies on extensive and multiple sources of data, such as public
documents, private letters, archival records, audiovisual materials, direct observations, physical
artifacts, and interviews (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Yin, 2018). My data collection included public
documents, archival records, audiovisual materials, and interviews. Specifically, the first phase
of data collection entailed a review of over 150 documents, and the second phase encompassed
12 interviews (i.e., five current and former legislators, five current and former higher education
officials; and two relevant private citizens).
Document Review
During phase one of data collection, I reviewed publicly available documents, such as
media news articles, legislative bills, legislative reports, legislative committee meeting agendas
and minutes, and other related material, as they pertained to Nevada bills: AJR 11, AB 331, and
AJR 5. I also reviewed Nevada Senate and Assembly Committees on Legislative Operations and
Elections and Committees on Education video recordings from the 79th (2017) and 80th (2019)
Legislative Sessions. Video recordings for the 72nd (2003) and 73rd (2005) Legislative Sessions
were unavailable. A thorough review of documents and recordings not only offered relevant
insight about the legislative policymaking process in Nevada, but it also helped identify primary
policy actors to interview during the second phase of my data collection.
Interviews
Informed by the document review, I used purposeful sampling to recruit, via email, an
initial group of policy actors and stakeholders to interview, such as current and former legislators
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and higher education officials associated with AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5 (see Appendix D for
my recruitment email). Purposeful sampling helped ensure participants who could contribute to
my understanding of the case (Creswell, 2016; Mills & Gay, 2016). I also employed snowball
sampling to locate additional participants by asking those interviewed to identify any other
relevant policy actors and stakeholders (Creswell, 2016). Over a two-month period, I interviewed
12 individuals of whom two had participated in the policymaking process across all three bills,
three had engaged across two bills and the remaining seven had participated in one of the bills
either as a legislator, higher education official, or private citizen. These interviews, combined
with the document review, allowed me to achieve data saturation or redundancy (Mills & Gay,
2016). I employed semi-structured interviews. The work of Turner (2010) and Creswell (2016)
guided my interview protocol design, which focused on understanding the preservation of
Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the framework of punctuated equilibrium
theory (see Appendix E for my interview protocol). Once interviews were scheduled, I emailed
participants copies of the interview protocol and informed consent. Prior to the start of each
interview, I verbally confirmed consent and receipt of the protocol. In addition, I disclosed my
graduate assistantship at The Lincy Institute, given the institute’s public support for
postsecondary governance reform in Nevada. All interviews were conducted by phone with the
exception of one interview, which was executed face-to-face at the participant’s request. The
longest interview lasted nearly 46 minutes while the shortest interview was completed just under
16 minutes. Most interviews ranged between 30 and 35 minutes. With the exception of one
participant, all interviewees gave consent to audio-record the interviews. Recordings were
transcribed via an IRB-approved transcription service. For readability, speech particles, such as
“um” or “ah,” were removed from the transcripts. I took minimal notes during most interviews,
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primarily jotting down my follow-up questions. After each interview, I emailed participants a
copy of their transcript to ensure accuracy and gain any additional comments. Five participants
responded with only minor grammatical edits or additional clarification on their responses.
Data Analysis
Analysis of data entailed repeated reading, coding, and memoing of textual material
collected from both interview transcripts and document reviews. The work of Yin (2018) and
Saldaña (2016) guided my data analysis and coding process. I started by determining my a priori
deductive codes based on Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (1993, 2009) punctuated equilibrium theory
and the literature review (Bradley, Curry, & Devers, 2007). Then, I employed inductive codes
based on emergent themes in the data. Specifically, I applied descriptive codes during first cycle
coding. In vivo coding of documents in general, and interview transcripts in particular, provided
me an emic perspective of the participants (Saldaña, 2016). I also used manifest and latent
content analysis specifically in my analysis of AJR 5 as a way to make inferences about
messages conveyed in the data (Berg, 2001).
During the second cycle of coding, I employed techniques of pattern matching (Yin,
2018) and constant comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to analyze the data. Pattern matching
entails comparing empirically-based patterns from my case study findings to alternative patterns
predicted before data collection and is one of the most advantageous techniques to use in case
study analysis (Yin, 2018). Constant comparison “involves taking one piece of data (one
interview, one statement, one theme) and comparing it with all others that may be similar or
different in order to develop conceptualizations of the possible relations between various pieces
of data” (Thorne, 2000, p. 69). Similar to Mills (2007), I analyzed text to illuminate similarities
and differences in perspectives expressed and to identify policy goals and rationales that led to
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support for, or against, AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5. I also sought to highlight the policy images
and policy venues associated with AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5 to understand how images and
venues influenced the life cycles of these three bills.
I used ATLAS.ti software primarily to support the coding process of interview
transcripts. Specifically, I created memos in Atlas.ti to record my insights and questions as I
analyzed, synthesized, and integrated the data into themes and findings (Saldaña, 2016). In
addition, I used the software to help identify salient codes and patterns within and across study
participants. Dominant codes were arranged into themes to describe patterns across the data. As
Stake (1995) has suggested, data analysis ultimately resulted in a thorough description of the
case, themes that emerged from the data, and assertions about the case (as cited in Creswell,
2016, p. 266).
Validity and Reliability: Trustworthiness
Validity and reliability, both measures of research design quality, have historically been
linked to quantitative research (Mills & Gay, 2016). However, Creswell and Poth (2018) have
indicated these two concepts are also important criteria for judging the robustness of qualitative
research. Qualitative scholars have generally reframed these quantitative concepts as
trustworthiness criteria, which include measures of credibility, transferability, dependability,
confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Anfara et al. (2002) have indicated credibility and
transferability are equivalent to internal and external validity, respectively, while dependability
and confirmability are comparable to reliability and objectivity, respectively (see Anfara et al.,
2002, Table 1, p. 30). For case study research, Yin (2018, p. 43) has articulated four criteria for
judging research design quality: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and
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reliability. Given my study was a qualitative case study, I used Yin’s approach to ensure
robustness.
Construct Validity
Construct validity is the “[identification of] correct operational measures for the concepts
being studied” (Yin, 2018, p. 42). Yin has contended multiple data sources and member checking
can help ensure construct validity. I collected evidence from a variety of data sources during the
review of documents and interviews to substantiate my findings. In addition, I shared the
interview transcripts with participants to confirm accuracy.
Internal Validity (Credibility)
Yin (2018) has defined internal validity as “seeking to establish a causal relationship,
whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from
spurious relationships” (p. 42). He has posited that internal validity is a consideration when a
researcher attempts to explain how and why event x led to event y. During data analysis, I used
pattern matching to compare empirical and predicted patterns, which “may be related to the
“how’s” and “why’s” of [my] case study” (Yin, 2018, p. 175). For example, how and why the
Nevada legislative policymaking process operated as it did, and how and why operations led to
certain results. Congruence between actual and predicted patterns served to strengthen the
study’s internal validity (Yin, 2018).
External Validity (Transferability)
External validity entails “showing whether and how a case study’s findings can be
generalized” (Yin, 2018, p. 42). Yin has suggested a “case study” should be thought of as an
opportunity to illuminate some theoretical concepts (i.e., analytical generalization) rather than as
a sample. In other words, analytical generalization from this study were “based on corroborating,

50

modifying, rejecting or otherwise advancing” theoretical elements of punctuated equilibrium
theory” (Yin, 2018, p. 38).
Reliability (Dependability)
Reliability is about “demonstrating that the operations of a study—such as its data
collection procedures—can be repeated, with the same results” (Yin, 2018, p. 42). According to
Yin, the goal of reliability is to reduce errors and biases during study replication. He has
highlighted three techniques: use a case study protocol, develop a case study database, and
maintain a chain of evidence, or audit trail, as Guba and Lincoln (1982) have suggested. I
developed a case study protocol to guide data collection. Moreover, my interview protocol
ensured a consistent line of questions for all participants. I housed my interview transcripts,
memos, and research diary within Atlas.ti. Finally, my audit trail included my IRB documents,
email correspondence, participant list, memos, and research diary.
Human Subjects and Ethical Considerations
I obtained informed consent from all voluntary participants verbally and/or via their
signature on an IRB-approved consent form prior to each interview (see Appendix F for the
consent form). The form delineated the purpose of the study, participant selection criteria, study
procedures, and any potential risks of participation, which was minimal. Because interview
participants included state politicians and public figures, I masked all identifiable characteristics
by using group-level identifiers to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. I avoided attributing
direct quotations to interview participants by name. However, I used names and quoted state
politicians and public figures when the data were publicly available, such as bill sponsorship,
public documents, and media releases. To ensure interview data remained confidential, I stored
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recordings and transcripts in a secure location accessible only by me and my dissertation
committee members.
Summary
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium
theory. The embedded single-case design focused on three unique higher education governance
reform bills: AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5, in order to examine Nevada’s legislative
policymaking process primarily during times of stasis. Multiple data sources from a review of
documents and interviews with policy actors and stakeholders served to triangulate the findings
and neutralize bias inherent in any one data source (Anfara et al., 2002).
Next, Chapter 4 addresses the results of this study. It also presents answers to my two
research questions: (1) How has the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process
facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education governance entity? (2) How is the
legislative policymaking process of the ongoing higher education governance reform bill,
Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or different from the process that addressed
Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, two former higher education governance
reform bills that were not passed?
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Chapter 4
Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium
theory. This study explored the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors
responded as they did and the context in which they responded by examining the life cycle of
three higher education governance reform bills unique in purpose and design (i.e., AJR 11, AB
331, and AJR 5). The primary research question that guided this study was: How has the state of
Nevada’s legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher
education governance entity? A secondary question asked: How is the legislative policymaking
process of the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5,
similar to and/or different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and
Assembly Bill 331, two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?
Three overarching themes emerged from extensive data analysis: (1) public support of
AJR 11 was insufficient to overcome a structure-induced equilibrium created by the Nevada
Constitution; (2) the policy solution AB 331 offered was too extreme and complex to garner
legislative support; and (3) perchance, unconventional tactics AJR 5 cosponsors used in the
legislative policymaking process of AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation
that ultimately reforms Nevada’s higher education governance entity. In this chapter, I address
embedded cases, AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5, respectively, first setting the scene and describing
pertinent events associated with each bill, and then presenting each finding. Unless otherwise
cited, all quotes are from interview participants or from those who offered legislative testimony.
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AJR 11: Insufficient Public Support to Overcome Structure-Induced Equilibrium
AJR 11 proposed “to amend the Nevada Constitution to provide for the election of certain
members of the Board of Regents and the gubernatorial appointment of certain members of the
Board of Regents, and to specify the number and terms of members” (p. 1). During the 2003 and
2005 Legislative Sessions, both the Senate and the Assembly passed AJR 11 by a constitutional
majority. In 2006, however, voters rejected Ballot Question No. 9 by a narrow 1.4% margin of
7,367 votes (277,174 votes opposed, 269,807 votes in favor), and AJR 11 died (“Nevada
Statewide Ballot Questions,” 2006). Discussing AJR 11’s demise, an interviewed legislator
stated, “People don’t like having their ability to vote on who their representatives are removed.”
Data analysis suggested voters likely rejected AJR 11 because they did not want to give
up their right to vote for regents, or any other elected officials, historically protected by the
Nevada Constitution. This sentiment was similarly articulated by five interview participants and
discussed by several legislators during the 2003 and 2005 committee hearings on AJR 11.
Additionally, absence of both widespread support and a public education campaign in favor of
AJR 11, and to a lesser extent, media’s push to vote ‘no’ on Ballot Question No. 9, buttressed the
structure-induced equilibrium provided by the Constitution, and ultimately led to the
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity. In the next two sections, I first set
the stage for this embedded case by briefly describing the pertinent events leading up to the
public’s dismissal of AJR 11. Then, I address the details of the finding.
Setting the Stage: AJR 11
Late afternoon April 3, 2003, during the 72nd Legislative Session, Democrat
Assemblywoman Chris Giunchigliani introduced AJR 11 to the Assembly Committee on
Elections, Procedures, and Ethics, a committee she also chaired in 2003. Addressing members, of
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whom five were Democrats and four were Republicans, she began, “The bill before you is a
recommendation for appointment of the Board of Regents.” She noted members had in their
possession background information on regent selection methods all other states used, and she
highlighted Nevada’s unique election process.
You will note that it is a ‘hodgepodge.’ I found no real consistency in any of those
formats. They have different government structures throughout. What I did find,
though, at least according to staff analysis that had been done, in their opinion, Nevada
was one of the only states that still did not have some form of appointment mechanism.
She continued, “The bill before you was written for full appointment of all seven regents.”
Unamended, AJR 11 not only gave the governor power to appoint all regents, it also downsized
the Board of Regents from thirteen to seven members and reduced their term from six to four
years. AJR 11 was later twice amended to reflect a nine-person blended board, comprised of six
governor appointed regents and three elected regents from Nevada’s three congressional districts,
and a term of four years. Bill item five also required “Not more than two-thirds of the appointed
members of the Board of Regents may be members of the same party” (AJR 11, 2003).
Policy problems AJR 11 aimed to mitigate. According to Assemblywoman
Giunchigliani’s testimony, the policy problems AJR 11 aimed to mitigate were the politicization
of the Board of Regents and board costs.
I think we need to empower them [Board of Regents] to be successful and to be policydriven, not micromanaging. You’re always going to have some politicization…but we’re
trying to depoliticize the board as much as possible. [ ] I also think it’s a way to save
dollars. If you look at the cost of just running that many board meetings for 13 people
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now, the last numbers I had were based, I believe, on an 11-member board, and it was
around $638,000 a year; that comes out of their funding formula.
Referring to potential dollars saved, she suggested that money could return to student programs.
That actually can go back into programs for students, and I think that ought to be the
ultimate goal of everybody, is to make sure that we’re providing the best education for
the students and then making sure the working conditions are good for the people that
chose to work within the system. That’s really the intent of AJR 11.
Name-dropping, she indicated Governor Kenny Guinn’s support of the bill. “I’ve spoken with
the governor. He wants the appointment. He would accept the blended concept as well.” She
closed stating, “This is a policy decision, and I wanted the decision to be made on that, not on
emotions or personalities as best we can get away from that.”
Antecedent controversy among regents bolstered support for AJR 11. In December
2002, the Las Vegas Sun reported, “errant behavior” of three regents had convinced the governor
to support AJR 11. Columnist Jeff German wrote:
Guinn is backing a serious bipartisan move for the 2003 Nevada Legislature to revamp
the selection process and the makeup of the board. ‘If the board is not restructured, it will
continue to be an embarrassment to the state,’ Guinn says. ‘This arguing back and forth is
not an efficient way to handle taxpayer dollars’. (p. 1)
As chronicled by numerous media articles, Regent Linda Howard had allegedly abused her
authority, obtaining thousands of UNLV student records; one record was that of a student who
had called Regent Howard an idiot in a UNLV newspaper editorial. In separate incidences,
Regent Mark Alden had called Regent Howard an “orangutan” during a morning radio show, and
Regent Howard Rosenberg had voted on the salary of a UNR vice president, sparking a conflict
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of interest inquiry. According to the Las Vegas Review-Journal (Patton, 2002), Regent Steve
Sisolak had gained Chancellor Jane Nichols’ and Regent Chair Doug Seastrand’s approval to
issue a collective public apology unbeknownst to Regents Howard, Alden, and Rosenberg.
Shortly after it was issued, Regent Howard told a radio show, “I don’t have anything to
apologize for, and I think there are a whole lot more apologies that need to come to me” (Patton,
2002, p. 1). Regent Sisolak then expressed his disappointment that ‘the glue is already
weakening.’ He stated, “What everyone needs to realize, including myself, is that the whole
board gets painted with the same brush if there’s a problem with even one regent’s behavior”
(Patton, 2002, p. 2).
Discussion and testimony during two consecutive legislative sessions. During the 2003
Legislative Session, AJR 11 was twice heard by the Assembly Committee on Elections,
Procedures, and Ethics and once heard by the Senate Government Affairs Committee. Similarly,
in 2005, AJR 11 was twice heard by both, the Assembly Committee on Elections, Procedures,
Ethics, and Constitutional Amendments and Senate Government Affairs Committee. The
Assembly Committee on Education never heard the bill; and no such committee existed in the
Senate in 2003 or 2005. During the first session, discussion especially among Senators, exposed
dissension on dimensions of the policy solution AJR 11 offered. According to legislative
minutes, Republican Senator William Raggio said, “He supported the idea of a generic bill,
which would provide for the election of some of the regents with the remaining members to be
appointed by the governor.” He indicated, “specific qualifications or items mandated for the
governor” should be deleted. Contrary to her peer, Democrat Senator Dina Titus said, “She
believed some direction for governors was important. She also said the combination of elected
and appointed regents would make the board more divided and more difficult to get consensus of
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opinion.” Thus, she articulated, “She would prefer to elect all regents, but limit the term and
number of regents.”
Public testimony in 2003 mostly opposed AJR 11. Speaking on behalf of the Board of
Regents during an Assembly committee hearing, Regent Chair Seastrand suggested a
constitutional amendment was “not to be taken lightly.” He testified the opinion of the regents
was “that they wanted to be representative of the people. They wanted to be elected by the
people so that they can respond to the constituencies that they are elected by.” He also
underscored the Constitution, which had stood for 140 years, and suggested it need not change.
I was recently reminded that there were several sections of the Constitution that create
different groups in the state: the Legislature, the constitutional officers, the judges, and
the regents. We, as regents, even have our own section. In all of those and others, they are
all elected, I think that was the foresight of those who framed the Constitution. It’s held
for 140 years. We would, as regents, feel that it would not be necessary to make a
change. We feel the current authority that this committee [Assembly Elections,
Procedures, and Ethics Committee] has, which is setting the size and the term of office,
should be sufficient.
Similar to Regent Sisolak’s earlier sentiment about one regent’s behavior being reflective of the
whole board, Regent Jill Derby testified:
It strikes me that to make radical changes in the system of government of higher
education that has really served us very well in Nevada for decades, because of the
disappointing actions of a few individuals, is really not well thought out and risks
throwing the baby out with the bath water. [ ] If there are problems with board behavior,
then it’s really a matter for the board to manage, and we’re in the process of doing that.
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To take on a radical change in our structure of higher education without very careful
thought worries me very much.
Besides the Board of Regents, three other groups testified in opposition in 2003: Nevada
Concerned Citizens, Nevada Eagle Forum, and the Independent American Party. All generally
expressed concern about Nevada citizens losing representation along with their right to vote for
regents. On the contrary, Carole Villardo, representing The Nevada Taxpayers Association,
testified in support of AJR 11 stating, “I think that we’ve reached a point in time where given the
change with the structure of the university system, given the dollars that are involved, that the
appointments are a proper way to go.”
Discussion and testimony in the 2005 Session committee hearings similarly represented
mixed perspectives on the policy dimensions of AJR 11. Members new to the Assembly
committee inquired about the appointment process and board reduction. For example, Democrat
Assemblyman Harvey Munford asked Assemblywoman Giunchigliani, “How would you select
those appointed members?” Minimal discussion occurred among Senators since only one new
member had joined the Senate committee in 2005. During this Session, no regents offered any
testimony, however, Vice Chancellor for Legal Affairs, UCCSN, Dan Klaich submitted
opposition testimony on behalf of Chancellor Jim Rogers and Vice Chancellor Jill Derby.
Primarily I am here to enter the chancellor and vice chair’s [chancellor’s] comments into
the record. We believe that in the last year, the board has come a long way in restoring its
collegiality, its cordiality, and its professionalism. We would encourage you not to react
in a way that deprives the people in the state of Nevada of the right to elect their regents
for higher education.
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Likewise, representatives from Nevada Concerned Citizens and Nevada Eagle Forum once again
testified against AJR 11. Additionally, UNLV faculty member, Dr. Ronald Remington,
highlighted the Board of Regents’ recent Open Meeting Law violation that had made national
news, and “he asked the committee if it was ever appropriate for elected officials to deny due
process, break state law and violate the public trust.” To which, Democrat Terry Senator Care
said, “There was no guarantee if the bill was passed, it would eliminate bullying or people
violating the Open Meeting Law.” Despite mixed support across the legislature, AJR 11 passed
both houses in both Sessions by a constitutional majority, and then subsequently advanced to the
citizens of Nevada for their vote on Ballot Question No. 9.
Ballot question no. 9. Crafted by the Legislative Council Bureau (LCB) and approved by
the Legislative Commission, Ballot Question No. 9 was one of ten statewide questions the public
considered in November 2006. Arguments for passage first singled out Nevada’s uniqueness;
“Nevada is the only state to elect a single board to govern all public institutions of higher
education” (“Nevada LCB,” n.d., p. 145). It then asserted the governor’s capacity to “appoint
members with the necessary education, credentials, and experience to administer this complex
system of higher education.” It also argued the Board of Regents was “too large, making the
board unworkable” and reducing the term would “make them [regents] more accountable and
responsive to the voters.” Arguments against passage conveyed taking “from the people their
right to vote on some members,” “inevitable friction” among blended-board members, reduced
board responsiveness, and concern that the governor “might appoint only those who share his
views.” It also argued a “four-year term is too short” to retain “institutional memory” and less
members would result in “less effective governance.” Finally, it highlighted “neither an elected
nor an appointed process guarantees a highly qualified board” and suggested “as the number of
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congressional districts continues to increase, along with Nevada’s growing population, the
regents would once again become an elected board.”
Besides question nine, three other questions originated in the legislature while the
remainder emerged via state or local level petitions. Questions focused on myriad issues, such as
priority state funding for K-12 education, minimum wage hike, and marijuana regulation. On
November 7th, 2006, the public approved five questions, including K-12 funding and minimum
wage hike, and rejected Ballot Question No. 9, along with marijuana regulation and three other
questions. As depicted in Tables 1 and 2 respectively, out of 17 counties, only Clark County
favored question nine and most Clark County legislators supported the measure as well.
Finding: Insufficient Public Support to Overcome a Structure-Induced Equilibrium
Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 2009) have contended policy stasis may be driven by a
structure-induced equilibrium, which according to Shepsle (1979) occurs when “institutional
arrangements may conspire with the preferences of individuals to produce structure-induced
equilibrium” (p. 27). The Nevada Constitution long bestowed upon its citizens the right to vote
for regents. An interview participant alluded to the Constitution’s power in maintaining that
right. “So I think once it's established that these positions are elected, I think it's hard to change
that, because people see that generally as taking away a right that they have.” The data suggested
voters likely rejected AJR 11 because they did not want to give up their right to vote for regents,
or any other elected officials, historically protected by the Nevada Constitution. This sentiment
was similarly articulated by five interview participants and discussed by legislators during the
2003 and 2005 AJR 11 committee hearings. Additionally, absence of both, widespread support
and a public education campaign in favor of AJR 11, and to a lesser extent, media’s push
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Table 1
2006 Public Voting on Ballot Question No. 9
______________________________________________________________________________
County
Yes
No
______________________________________________________________________________
Carson City
Churchill
Clark
Douglas
Elko
Esmeralda
Eureka
Humboldt
Lander
Lincoln
Lyon
Mineral
Nye
Pershing
Storey
Washoe
White Pine

7,343
3,424
176,045
7,788
5,114
145
254
1,784
688
702
6,289
781
5,319
530
716
51,471
1,414

9,914
4,331
161,696
10,096
6,222
261
428
2,475
1,020
1,064
7,939
1,190
5,925
912
1,067
61,461
1,713

Total
269,807
277,714
Percent
49.28
50.72
_____________________________________________________________________________
Note. Adapted from Nevada Secretary of State, 2006 Statewide General Election Results.
Table 2
2003 and 2005 Clark County Legislators Voting on Ballot Question No. 9
______________________________________________________________________________
2003
2005
______________________________________________________
Yes
No
Yes
No
______________________________________________________________________________
Senate

8

6

8

6

Assembly

22

7

24

5
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to vote ‘no’ on Ballot Question No. 9, buttressed the structure-induced equilibrium provided by
the Constitution, leading to the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity.
Citizens did not want to give up their right vote. Although citizens only narrowly
defeated AJR 11, data analysis clearly suggested many Nevadans cherished their sovereign right
to vote for all elected representatives, including the Board of Regents. An interview participant,
who was part of the Assembly at the time of AJR 11, conveyed:
I think the primary issue is it [AJR 11] takes the right away from citizens to vote, and
historically in Nevada, Nevadans have liked the right to vote. They like voting for judges.
They like to vote for regents. They like to vote for mosquito abatement control board.
Similarly, another former legislator offered a more recent example, underscoring the public’s
preference to maintain its voting jurisdiction.
We had a bill about fluoridating water, and currently it’s a vote of the people, and we
were trying to mandate it. The biggest argument wasn’t even about the positive or
negative of the fluoride, it was about, you’re taking away our right to vote.
Yet, a third former legislator commenting on the defeat of AJR 11 simply stated, “Whether it
makes sense or not, people like to vote for judges and regents and whatnot. So I do think that
was a major factor.” Likewise, a higher education official expressed, “…Nevadans have liked to
elect individuals, even if they don’t understand what they do.”
The data also suggested public concern about possible spillover effects into other voting
arenas if AJR 11 was adopted. A citizen lobbyist testified, “We see a movement, not just on this
bill, but on others, that would take way our right to vote on different offices in the state of
Nevada.” She proceeded, “I know this [AJR 11] is well-meaning. We want the very best kind of
government we can have, and we need to go carefully as we change the Constitution.” She
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asserted the Constitution was a structure meant to be difficult to change. “The reason it’s hard to
change the Constitution is because it was meant to be that way, so we can walk carefully towards
any kind of change that we make…because if you make a mistake, it sure is hard to change.”
Coupled with public concern over keeping the right to vote, the data also revealed unease
over potential loss of public representation associated with governor appointed regents. One
interviewee highlighted loss of public influence associated with the appointment process.
They [public] don’t agree with all this closed shop appointment. They see what happens
in the bureaucracy. They see they have little enough to say by electing people. When you
have people appointed, you have almost nothing to say. You have no influence.
This participant suggested appointed members exacerbate public representation. “It just makes it
farther away from the people, makes it more difficult. You know, you can go and see one person
that’s on the Board of Regents.” Later, the interviewee underscored, “The more you exclude the
public, the more private decisions are made by bureaucrats and unelected people. The further
removed they get from what the people want done with their [taxpayer] money.”
Absence of widespread support and no supporting education campaign. Reflecting
on the months leading up to the ballot measure vote, a higher education official suggested
absence of widespread support for AJR 11 likely led to the bill’s demise.
As I recall, there wasn’t a huge effort to promote the passage of it. I don’t know, people
weren’t that interested. As I recall, they didn’t raise a whole bunch of money and start
running ads or anything. It just appeared on the ballot and people looked at it and decided
without encouragement.
Similarly, in a 2006 article the Las Vegas Sun imputed paucity of support to the bill sponsor’s
higher priority campaign of running for county commissioner.
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Regents say the hybrid board is a “recipe for disaster,” that forcing regents to run in
congressional districts would be too costly, and that despite the past, the board is now
functioning fine. If regents aggressively oppose the amendment, they’ll draw attention to
it and appear self-serving, several regents told Rosenberg. And because its chief
proponent, state Assemblywoman Chris Giunchigliani, D-Las Vegas, is too busy running
for Clark County commissioner to campaign in favor of Question 9, they are hoping the
bill will fail for lack of interest. (p. 3)
Besides deficient support, absence of a public education campaign in favor of AJR 11 also likely
contributed to the bill’s defeat. A former legislator stated, “I think it was just a lack of
education…that was a bill that needed education.” Articulating the sentiment of two other
interviewees, the same participant implied without proper messaging it was challenging to gain
support from a seemingly disengaged public.
I don’t know that the public, it doesn’t mean they don’t care. I just don’t know that they
necessarily were as engaged as one would think. Because if your kids don’t go to higher
ed, they’re not worrying about community college versus where the dollars go. The
formula, all those things are nuanced and it depends on how the messaging comes down.
The interviewee further noted, “It [AJR 11] was not a sexy issue. And so I don’t know that much
was said one way or another. Because sometimes it’s the jazz or pizazz of a bill that makes it
noteworthy.”
Messaging via the media. Eight days prior to the ballot measure vote, the Las Vegas Sun
recommended “no” on question nine. Although they supported a board member reduction, they
suggested the “proposal would create a strange mix of regents - three elected and six appointed and that makes no sense to us, especially as the board has worked together much better since

65

hiring Jim Rogers as chancellor” (2006, p. 2). A couple weeks earlier, the Las Vegas ReviewJournal had also recommended “no” on question nine. “While shrinking the size of the board
certainly has merit, limiting voter involvement in selecting who oversees Nevada’s higher
education system is the wrong approach” (2006, p. 8B). Other outlets, such as the Reno GazetteJournal, Nevada Appeal, and Las Vegas CityLife, seemed to take no stand on question nine and
merely summarized the issues for and against AJR 11. Commenting to the Las Vegas Sun in
2006, on the narrow defeat of AJR 11, Regent Bret Whipple chalked up the close vote “to
confusing language, and not because of any consensus by the public that there are problems with
the board” (p. 1). Next, I address AB 331.
AB 331: A Solution Too Extreme and Complex to Garner Legislative Support
Officially titled, “Creates the Nevada System of Community Colleges. (BDR 34-28),”
AB 331 proposed to “transfer authority for the supervision and control of community colleges
from the Board of Regents to the State Board for Community Colleges and the boards of trustees
of such community colleges” (p. 2), along with creating an Articulation and Transfer Board. Like
AJR 11, the legislative policymaking process surrounding AB 331 resulted in the preservation of
Nevada’s higher education governance entity. Unlike AJR 11, which passed two consecutive
legislative sessions before it failed, AB 331 died after a single Assembly committee hearing. “It
never came up for a vote. I personally would have been against it,” a former committee member
articulated. “I don't remember whether it was the chair, the caucus, or leadership who made that
decision, but it just wasn't ready. There were too many concerns.” Similarly, another former
committee member expressed, “It was a huge confusing bill. It would do so many things that it
was hard to know what you would end up with. The member stated, “I didn’t talk to the chair
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about why that did not pass. But I would guess that it was a lot to digest. It was a big change. My
preference before big changes are to study things.”
The data suggested the separate community college governance structure AB 331 offered
was a solution too extreme and complex. Moreover, legislators realized the Articulation and
Transfer Board specifically, could be implemented under the existing governance structure. This
policy image of the solution along with negotiations that occurred behind the scenes between
regents and college presidents likely prevented AB 331 from making the legislature’s decisionmaking agenda. To a lesser extent, limited supporting testimony and opposition testimony from
Nevada’s four in situ community college presidents may have also reinforced the preservation of
Nevada’s postsecondary governance entity. Before expounding on the overall finding and other
possible contributing factors, I provide a description of the committee hearing and sequence of
events to contextualize the embedded case of AB 331.
Setting the Stage: AB 331
Late afternoon April 3, 2017, midway through the 120-day 79th Legislative Session
(February 6 through June 6), the Nevada Assembly Committee on Education convened to hear
testimony on proposed higher education governance reform initiative, AB 331, along with one
other postsecondary initiative and two K-12 education bills. With the exception of one excused
assemblywoman, all other 13 members were present. About one hour into the hearing, after first
addressing both K-12 bills, Democrat Chairman Tyrone Thompson opened the hearing on AB
331 and guest legislator, Republican Assemblyman Ira Hansen, introduced his bill to a
committee of eight Democrats and five Republicans. AB 331 discussion lasted one hour and nine
minutes, nearly half of the hearing’s duration (two hours and twenty-three minutes).
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Policy problems AB 331 aimed to resolve. According Assemblyman Hansen, AB 331
sought to fix an archaic postsecondary education system that was “not working efficiently or
equitably” for the “community colleges as compared to [the] universities.” He testified, “What
worked in 1968 is no longer working today.” He underscored the recently changed funding
formula as a specific reason “community colleges are being left behind in terms of equitable
distribution of funding.” Moreover, he suggested that changing the higher education governance
structure would address other challenges, “including meeting economic development goals and
best serving the needs of all Nevada’s students.”
Three special guests offered opening statements. After a brief bill introduction,
Assemblyman Hansen’s “three special guests,” Dr. Carol Lucey, President Emeritus of WNC,
Dr. John Gwaltney, President Emeritus of TMCC, and Dr. Ron Remington, past president of
both GBC and CSN shared their extensive experience as college presidents in NSHE, as well as
their postsecondary experience outside the system. All expressed support for separate community
college governance and their statements centered on what they perceived as weaknesses in the
Nevada higher education governance system. For example, Dr. Lucey suggested, “most states,
generally use local community college governance boards to manage their colleges.” She noted,
“That alignment between local community, college board, and president is indeed what makes
theses colleges ‘community’ colleges.” She also reported she had resigned shortly after the 2013
Legislative Session because she had testified in that session in support of Senate Bill (SB) 391,
which amended, called for an interim study concerning the governance structure of and funding
methods for the community colleges. “I resigned not long after that, as I knew I would have to
do. It is important to understand that college presidents cannot disagree with their governing
boards. When they do, they must be prepared to resign.” In closing, she emphasized, “That
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should be borne in mind today as you hear opinions on all sides of this issue.” Dr. Gwaltney
identified the problem as the system. “When you have a system where everybody works hard to
do a good job and the outcome is not what it should be, that is a problem. The problem is not
people. The problem is the system.” Dr. Remington, who had previously testified in support of
AJR 11 in 2005, reported he had 40 years of higher education experience and 30 of those years
were spent with NSHE. He noted issues within the system had not changed. “Since I date back to
1973 with service to Nevada, I can tell you that this hearing could have occurred in 1977, 1987,
1997, 2007, or currently. The issues are the same.”
Hearing opened for committee members’ questions. After the three special guests
concluded, Chairman Thompson opened the floor for committee members’ questions. Of the
thirteen members present, six questioned the former presidents. Assemblywomen Lisa Krasner
and Amber Joiner, both also NSHE community college instructors, couched their questions in
their adoration for the role of community colleges. Republican Assemblywoman Krasner stated,
“I teach at Truckee Meadows Community College, and I love community colleges.” She asked,
“…will there be enough money for the community colleges if they separate from the university
system? I certainly would not want anything bad to happen to the community colleges.”
Democrat Assemblywoman Joiner declared, “This is a really big decision, and one that I do not
take lightly. Having taught at both the university and at the community college level, I truly just
want to figure out what is best for community college students.” While Assemblywoman Krasner
addressed AB 331’s primary proposed solution (i.e., separate community college governance),
Assemblywoman Joiner emphasized bill sections 146 through 148, the Articulation and Transfer
Board. She stated:
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This issue of articulation and transfer is extremely important to me. [ ] If you are saying
that is one of the problems that students are facing in community colleges that cannot be
addressed in the current system, I would just like for you to expand on that please. [ ]
Could we have an Articulation and Transfer Board without breaking up the system? Has
that been considered?
Questions from both Assemblymen Edgar Flores and Elliot Anderson centered on their concern
over testimony about college presidents’ inability to act and speak in the interest of their colleges
and students, rather than the proposed policy solution. Democrat Assemblyman Flores asked,
“Would NSHE show up at your door and tell you that if you do not do this, you are out? Would
they rally troops around you to get you out? Searching for factual evidence, Democrat
Assemblyman Anderson focused his query on opposition letters the four current community
college presidents submitted as exhibits to the committee hearing.
I want to get into the issue where it is sort of being implied that the community colleges
are not being able to give us their full feelings. That may be true, but do you have
information specifically that the community college presidents feel differently than what
we are seeing in the letters?
Finally, Democrat Assemblyman Edwards asked about the advantages of a separate governance
structure for community colleges, and the chairman inquired, “When you are talking about that it
is more local, do we really have the local support and/or capacity to support something as huge
as this?”
Supporting testimony. Chairman Thompson then moved on to supporting testimony.
One private citizen of Carson City and a Nevada Manufacturers Association representative, Mr.
Ray Bacon, lent support. Mr. Bacon underscored the proposed Articulation and Transfer Board.
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“A really important point I would like to make is that the articulation board that is in this bill is
absolutely the number one point.” Besides these testimonials, four private citizens (one a former
assemblywoman and three associated with Nevada’s colleges) lent support via exhibit letters.
Opposing testimony. Next, the chairman sought opposing testimony. All four in situ
college presidents testified against AB 331. Drs. Mark Curtis (GBC) and Michael Richards
(CSN) testified via videoconference from their colleges, while Drs. Chester Burton (WNC) and
Karin Hilgersom (TMCC) addressed the legislature in Carson City. Drs. Curtis, Richards, and
Burton all acknowledged they were on their final NSHE contract, and they highlighted their
letters of opposition and countered Dr. Lucey’s statement that college presidents cannot disagree
with their governance board without consequences. As the newest president hired June 2016, Dr.
Hilgersom indicated she was “…speaking with a new perspective. I believe that the NSHE
system is working. [ ] No system is perfect. There is a lot of room for improvement within
NSHE, and I’m hoping that I can help with those improvements in the next several years.” No
other individuals or groups personally testified against the bill; however, the Executive Director
of the Northern Nevada Development Authority, who was also the Chairman of Western Nevada
College’s Institutional Advisory Council (IAC), submitted a letter of opposition. IACs were a
policy outcome of the 2013 SB 391 interim study of community college governance and funding.
Closing remarks. With no individuals offering neutral testimony, the chair gave the floor
to Assemblyman Hansen for closing remarks. However, Assemblyman Flores interjected with a
follow-up comment for Assemblyman Hansen, “I imagine you had an opportunity to speak with
NSHE.” Assemblyman Hansen replied:
On this specific topic, I have not had any conversation with any member. No one
approached me about this bill. I have not had a single word from anybody in the Nevada
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System of Higher Education. The answer is that I have not heard a word from anybody as
far as offering amendments—basically I have not had a word from anybody to amend my
bill. I am a little mystified as to why none of them showed up to testify against it. They
obviously had the community college people do that. I hate to answer for them, but it is
their responsibility to show up.
Assemblyman Flores emphasized his desire to hear from NSHE and the regents. “Moving
forward, if I could ask that you please send them an email and let us know.” Assemblyman
Hansen curtly replied:
No problem. Sure. Right now, I am sure there are many members that are paying very
close attention to this hearing, so we will put on the record right now that Assemblyman
Hansen has reached out formally and publicly. My doors are open and my email is
irahansen@irahansen.com.
Then, he presented closing remarks, seizing an opportunity to highlight “scandalous” actions tied
to the funding formula creation and governance structure and blaming the regents and chancellor
for the policy problems AB 331 aimed to resolve.
It was hinted at in the testimony that we had quite a scandal in Nevada between the 2013
Session and after the 2015 Session. We found out that the Board of Regents, through the
Chancellor, had supposedly contacted a completely independent board to review the
funding mechanism. In addition, critical to this, what we discovered is that this
independent board was not independent at all. I want to get this on the record. Daniel
Klaich referred to the "think tank," this independent board, as his special consultant, in a
message to his confidant, Jane Nichols, who was herself a former chancellor still working
in the system in a different role. Nichols advised him that the system would "have the

72

ideal outcome of our formula study in our hip pocket." The relationship was so close that
this organization was actually allowed to use the letterhead of the supposedly
independent company, write what they wanted on it, then have that so-called independent
group send it to them as if it was a response after they wrote the answers. What does that
have to do with this? The funding formula that is in SB 391 of the 77th Session, the
governance structure, came from where? Remember this governance structure and this
whole thing was done prior to the exposé that was done by the Las Vegas ReviewJournal. Who came up with the governance structure? None other than the exact same
group that was in the pocket of the Board of Regents. Lo and behold, they came up with a
governance structure recommendation which we all received in SB 391 of the 77th
Session bulletin which you can pick up. What is it? It is ironically, exactly what the
Board of Regents wanted.
Finding: A Solution Too Extreme and Complex
Baumgartner (1989) has suggested political conflict in policymaking entails three areas:
whether a problem exists, what the best solution is, and what the best means of implementation
are (as cited in Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). AB 331 made the legislature’s policy agenda so the
existence of a problem was not in dispute. In fact, a former legislator articulated:
I get why the community colleges came. I think it's the funding issue and a priority issue.
They really saw the Board of Regents make that shift to not giving them enough funding,
not giving them enough authority to self-direct.
Even two of the four sitting college presidents, Drs. Burton and Hilgersom, acknowledged in
their testimony the good intentions of the bill despite their opposition. The data suggested the
separate community college governance structure AB 331 offered was a solution too extreme
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and complex. Moreover, legislators learned the Articulation and Transfer Board specifically,
could be implemented under the existing governance system. This policy image of the solution
along with negotiations that occurred behind the scenes between regents and college presidents
likely prevented AB 331 from making the legislature’s decision-making agenda. To a lesser
extent, limited supporting testimony and opposition testimony from Nevada’s four in situ
community college presidents may have also contributed to the preservation of Nevada’s
postsecondary governance entity.
An extreme and complex solution. For some legislators, the policy solution of separate
governance for Nevada’s four community colleges was too extreme and complex. During one
interview, a former legislator expressed their primary angst with AB 331:
My biggest concern was that if they were to break off, which we have seen in other
states, and I remember reading and being informed about how it didn't go well with other
states sometimes with schools broke off. It worked okay in California I think. But in
other places, what happens when they break off then, is then they are battling against the
main Board of Regents to the legislature for funding. I almost felt like they were putting
themselves at a disadvantage.
“To break off” explicitly suggested a drastic solution, which might “disadvantage” the
community colleges. This same participant later shared, “I didn't think it was well structured. I
thought it was a little bit too premature to break them off. Because it seems like their issues
could be fixed, or reformed.”
Queries from Assemblywoman Krasner and Chairman Thompson during the hearing
focused on the solution’s feasibility. Assemblywoman Krasner asked, “Will there be enough
money for the community colleges if they separate from the university system.” To which, Dr.
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Gwaltney replied that they were not suggesting an increase in funding. They were “convinced if
the community college bill is successful, all of the necessary funding that goes to NSHE is not
necessary anymore.” The new community college governance structure he indicated:
…will take roughly 51% of all students out of the system. It would strike me as highly
unlikely that all the work being done by NSHE would have been done for only the
universities and therefore, the system could not up any funds that support that. We do not
really see any additional expenditure from the state right now.
Almost contradictory however, he suggested:
… life might be a little messier in the future because community college presidents will
bring their priorities here to you directly in the next session and the session after that.
They will not be laundered through a university-centered system. At some point, I think
the funding might change.
Chairman Thompson asked, “When you are talking about that it is more local, do we really have
the local support and/or capacity to support something as huge as this?” Following Dr. Lucey’s
response about communities having “buy-in that they now lack,” the chairman followed-up. “I
am talking money. Support and encouragement are one thing. But having the actual dollars is
what I want to talk about.” Dr. Lucey then highlighted Washington state, which AB 331 was
modeled after, however, in closing she questioned whether she had answered the chairman’s
question and reiterated her initial response about local support via “buy-in.”
The colleges survive on tuition and their general fund dollars. In exchange for that, there
is no local election, for example, of the Board of Trustees at those colleges. They are
gubernatorial appointments, which is why you see ‘gubernatorial appointment’ in this

75

board. I am not sure if I have answered your question, but I think you see buy-in when
you see that the community has something to say about their college.
Immediately after Dr. Lucey’s response, Chairman Thompson moved to supporting testimony.
Besides the extreme nature of AB 331, the complexity of the bill likely contributed to its
demise. During the bill’s introduction, the bill sponsor began by jokingly stating, at the request
of the committee chairman, he would go through the entire bill, “all 325 sections of it.”
Responding to a room full of laughter, the chairman half-chuckled, “That was not the request.
Wrong email.” When pointing out some of the most pertinent sections of the bill, Assemblyman
Hansen underscored section 146, which created the Articulation and Transfer Board. In essence,
he prioritized this dimension of the complex solution, by emotionally appealing to his fellow
legislators, some of whom were also community college instructors. “I want to emphasize the
importance of this board in addressing problems and challenges that we have seen when students
attempt to transfer from community colleges to universities, not to mention from high school to
college.” At least one committee member latched on to this idea, and when the hearing was
opened for members’ questions, the legislature discovered this dimension of the solution could
be implemented without passage of AB 331. By reframing and reducing her initial three-part
question to a single question, Assemblywoman Joiner ascertained from Dr. Gwaltney that “it is
possible” to have an Articulation and Transfer Board, as portrayed in AB 331 and modeled after
the state of Florida ,“under the current system without breaking the community colleges off.”
Negotiations behind the scenes. During one interview, a former legislator reported
negotiations behind the scenes may have been a reason why the sitting college presidents
opposed AB 331. Moreover, this participant suggested the regents’ appointment of a Vice
Chancellor for Community Colleges increased the colleges’ power within the system.
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They did get some things out of this bill. For example, I know that the Board of Regents
appointed a vice chancellor, a very high level person who is in charge of community
colleges now. It is possible that they negotiated behind the scenes with the Regents and
said, ‘if we come out against this bill because it's too extreme or too big of a change, will
you give us things?’ They absolutely got a Vice Chancellor for Community Colleges and
an entire board that the vice chancellor oversees that’s advisory. So, they did gain power
within the system, and that may have been why they were okay with the bill dying. They
absolutely got things out of this bill, though, not legislatively. There was negotiation
behind the scenes for sure.
Similarly, another interviewee suggested:
…the changes made within the system addressed the concerns that the legislative
sponsors had as far as the Vice Chancellor for Community College's emphasis on the
community college committee and community college issues coming forward. So I think
in that case there were specific issues that the legislators wanted addressed and the board
addressed them.
From this participant’s perspective, these antecedent actions by the Board of Regents may have
been a reason why AB 331 died in Assembly.
Finally and to a lesser extent, limited supporting testimony primarily from three past
college presidents and opposition testimony from Nevada’s four in situ community college
presidents may have reinforced the preservation of Nevada’s postsecondary governance entity.
However, a former Assembly member suggested, “Sometimes, bills just aren't ready. It isn't that
there's a huge clear opposition that kills it. Sometimes, it's just like, we need to think about this
more, and it [AB 331] was a really big decision.” Next I address the final embedded case, AJR 5.
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AJR 5: Unconventional Tactics May Induce Policy Punctuation and Reform
Authorized to be cited as the Nevada Higher Education Reform, Accountability and
Oversight Amendment, AJR 5, has unprecedentedly proposed to “amend the Nevada Constitution
to remove the constitutional provisions governing the election and duties of the Board of Regents
of the State University and to authorize the Legislature to provide by statute for the governance,
control and management of the State University and for the reasonable protection of individual
academic freedom” (p. 1). Unlike the outcome of AJR 11 and AB 331, both of which resulted in
the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity, the outcome of AJR 5 is still
undecided since the public will not vote on the bill until November 2020 (see Appendix G for
attempts at punctuations). Consequently, data analysis of the AJR 5 embedded case singularly
addressed my secondary research question: how is the legislative policymaking process of the
ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or
different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331,
two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?
An extensive analysis of data suggested AJR 5 cosponsors’ unconventional tactics used
to define the policy image of Nevada’s postsecondary governance system were pivotal in
mobilizing sufficient legislative support in two consecutive Sessions and may favorably sway
voters in November 2020, ultimately inducing for the first time, a policy punctuation and higher
education governance reform. Specifically, AJR 5 cosponsors cleverly designed a policy solution
to explicitly exclude any public loss of voting rights. AJR 5 also appeared to benefit both
legislature and faculty, thus aiding legislators’ adoption of the bill. Cosponsors’ use of historical
court case analogies during committee hearings (Taliaferro, 1994) likely helped establish a
favorable reference from which legislators could evaluate problems AJR 5 aimed to resolve (as
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cited in Zahariadis, 2003). Finally, their strategic manipulation of sequential decision-making,
known as a salami tactic (Zahariadis, 2003), presumably facilitated the legislature’s passage of
AJR 5. In the next two sections, I first set the stage, outlining relevant events associated with the
policymaking process of AJR 5. Then, I address the finding, highlighting how the policymaking
process of AJR 5 mostly differed from the policymaking processes of AJR 11 and AB 331.
Setting the Stage: AJR 5
On March 2, 2017, early into the 120-day 80th Legislative Session (February 6 through
June 6), Democrat Chairwoman Olivia Diaz convened the Nevada Assembly Committee on
Legislative Operations and Elections to hear nearly ninety minutes of testimony on AJR 5. After
five minutes spent addressing two other bills, the eleven-person committee, comprised of seven
Democrats and four Republicans, stood at ease an additional five minutes, awaiting arrival of
AJR 5 cosponsor Democratic Senator Joyce Woodhouse. Around 1:50 p.m. the Senator kicked
off the hearing with a brief three minute introduction, and then cosponsor Assemblyman Elliot
Anderson specifically addressed AJR 5 for eight minutes. According to Senator Woodhouse,
AJR 5 was part of “a two-piece Nevada higher education reform act in response to recent
events.” While AJR 5 called for constitutional change, AB 390 sought to create a statutory
Spending and Government Efficiency Commission for NSHE and expand whistleblower
protections for system employees “to include disclosure of any information involving false or
misleading statements made to the Legislature.” The Assembly unanimously approved AB 390,
however, the Senate never voted on it, thus the statutory piece of the higher education reform act
ceased in 2017. On the contrary, AJR 5 overwhelmingly passed two consecutive Sessions with
bipartisan support, and twice amended, it aimed to remove the Board of Regents from the
Constitution and enshrine academic freedom.
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Policy problems AJR 5 aimed to resolve. According to the cosponsors’ 2017 opening
testimony, the problems AJR 5 aimed to resolve included NSHE’s unacceptable behavior, the
legislature’s access to information, and Nevada’s antiquated constitutional governance of higher
education. Similar to Assemblyman Hansen’s AB 331 closing remarks, Senator Woodhouse
emphasized NSHE’s recent unacceptable behavior. She stated, “In the lead-up to this session and
previous sessions, the Nevada System of Higher Education tried to control, alter, and
misrepresent information provided to policymakers, including the legislature. Obviously, this is
unacceptable.” Although she commended Regent Chair Rick Trachok and Acting Chancellor
John White for “taking interim steps to correct some of these issues,” she noted, “… as
policymakers, we must stay focused on building systems, not on individual personalities. Today
we are not talking about personalities; we are talking about the system.” She continued, “We
owe the citizens of Nevada a culture of accountability in all levels of government. The higher
education system belongs to all Nevadans.” Assemblyman Anderson focused on what he
perceived as Nevada’s archaic approach to postsecondary governance. He articulated,
“Constitutional governance serves as an antiquated way to govern higher education.” He
suggested, “The only reason that it [Board of Regents] is in the Nevada Constitution in the first
place was to access the Land-Grant College Act of 1862 upon getting statehood without any
action on the part of the legislature.” As he continued, he opined about what he believed was a
misinterpretation of the original intent of the drafters of the Constitution. He suggested drafters’
had not intended to preclude the legislature’s role in postsecondary governance despite the
provision which stated, “The Legislature shall provide for the establishment of a State University
which shall be under the control of the Board of Regents.” Then, he indicated that notion of
exclusion existed today and was an impediment to postsecondary governance reform.
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[The provision] is often used to obstruct efforts to align higher education governance and
administration with the state’s demographic and economic needs. Indeed, NHSE
regularly interprets this provision very expansively to suggest that it is the fourth branch
of government, extending the constitutional authority of the Board of Regents to govern
the three branches of the University of Nevada: UNR, UNLV, and DRI. [ ] In short, this
provision has become an impediment to reform.
He also contended an elected part-time board whose majority of members lacked higher
education policy background “is unable to manage the sprawling higher education apparatus that
has flourished under these arrangements. In practice, this arrangement results in too strong of an
education bureaucracy.” He pointed to Nevada’s low higher education performance. “…Nevada
is a bottom-dweller in higher education performance and is the only state of its size without a
university attaining top Carnegie classification rankings.” He said, “It is time Nevada changes
the way that higher education is organized.” According to Assemblyman Anderson, AJR 5 “is an
important step in doing so. It will provide the flexibility to the Legislature to consider different
alternatives for the structure for our system in line with much of the discussion that has happened
over the past five years.”
Discussion and testimony in the 2017 committee hearings. During the 2017 Session,
AJR 5 was twice heard by both Assembly and Senate Committees on Legislative Operations and
Elections. Similar to AJR 11 hearings, neither house Committees on Education heard AJR 5
despite the policy implications for higher education. In the Senate, AJR 5 discussion largely
focused on the bill’s inclusion of a resolution name, i.e., Nevada Higher Education Reform,
Accountability and Oversight Amendment, and whether the name matched the bill text. Much of
the Assembly’s discussion focused on educating legislators about what AJR 5 did and did not
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propose to do, especially as it related to citizens’ right to vote for the Board of Regents. Central
to discussion was a historical case law presentation on the constitutional balance of power
between the legislature and Board of Regents LCB legal analyst Kevin Powers provided at the
committee chair’s request.
The first Assembly hearing on AJR 5 in 2017. From the very first AJR 5 hearing, bill
cosponsors adamantly stated they were not seeking a constitutional change to the Board of
Regents election process. Assemblyman Anderson reiterated the same general message on
several occasions.
We are not seeking to get rid of elections for the Board of Regents. There are statutes on
point that provide for the election of the Board of Regents. We are not proposing to
change that whatsoever. I want to make sure that is very clear to the committee because
there has been some confusion on that.
Offering further assurances, Chairwoman Diaz at one point asked, “Just so the record is clear,
this bill does not seek to change the ability to elect the Board of Regents. Is that correct?”
Assemblyman Anderson replied, “That is correct,” and Mr. Powers confirmed it as well, citing
the current Nevada statute. “Assemblyman Anderson is referencing Nevada Revised Statutes
(NRS) 396.040. It provides that the Board of Regents consists of 13 members elected by the
registered voters within the districts described in that chapter of NRS.”
Prior to opening the floor for members’ questions, Chairwoman Diaz invited Mr. Powers
“to comment on the balance of authority between the Legislature and the Board of Regents.” He
began, “First and foremost, there is no such thing as a fourth branch of government. I cannot say
that emphatically enough. Nor is there any entity that is independent of the three branches of
government.” He indicated the Board of Regents was an entity under the Executive Branch,
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charged with “carrying out and enforcing the law governing higher education.” Then he
delineated the balance of authority between the board and legislature.
The framers in the Nevada Constitution took a slice of the sovereign power given to the
Executive Branch and dedicated that to the Board of Regents. That slice of sovereign
power from the Executive Branch is narrow in scope for the Board of Regents. It only
applies to the internal management of the internal affairs of the university. By contrast,
the Legislature retains all inherent sovereign power of the people except where expressly
limited by the Nevada Constitution or the U.S. Constitution.
He suggested the board’s “slice of sovereign power” limited the legislature’s ability to legislate,
and articulated, “The question that has persisted over the years in Nevada is what is the extent of
the limitation on the Legislature's power with regard to the governance of the university?” After
citing two cases (see Appendix H for case histories), King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533
(1948) and Board of Regents v. Oakley, 637 P.2d 1199 (1981), both of which entailed Nevada
court interpretations of the Board of Regents’ powers, he specified AJR 5.
With regard to AJR 5, the proposal is to remove the Board of Regents from the Nevada
Constitution, but not to remove the Board of Regents from the law. By removing the
Board of Regents from the Nevada Constitution, it is no longer a constitutionally-created
body that has a sovereign slice of constitutional power. Instead, it will be like any other
state Executive Branch agency created by statute. It will be subject to the governance,
control, and management of the Legislature through the enactment of statutes. [ ] It could
still exercise its statutory power, but it would not have that constitutional barrier.
Therefore, the Board of Regents would be subject to the entire power and authority of the
Legislature through regularly enacted statutes.
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No groups outside of the legislature testified in support of AJR 5 during the initial Assembly
hearing, however, several committee members articulated their support. Assemblyman Ira
Hansen, who would later present AB 331 to the Assembly Education Committee, backed AJR 5
and suggested the cosponsors “…better come up with some way to put a little oil on troubled
waters because it is clear that the number one reason people are objecting to this whole idea is
that they do not want to lose the right to vote for people who are going to represent them on the
Board of Regents.” Democrat committee members Skip Daly and Shannon Bilbray-Axelrod also
voiced their support for AJR 5.
Speaking on behalf of the board, Regent Vice Chair Allison Stephens and Regent Jason
Geddes testified in opposition. Their testimony favorably characterized the board’s slice of
sovereign power and countered cosponsors’ earlier points, such as the Board of Regents as a
fourth branch of government. Regent Vice Chair Stephens spoke first.
Right now, we have a Board of Regents whose sole function is to study and understand
higher education and all the intricacies that are involved therein. We started talking about
things like curriculum, tenure, shared governance, and workforce development. Those are
the only issues that we are focused on. That is the only charge that we have, in addition to
the fiduciary responsibility. The governance by a Board of Regents allows for that
specialized attention, but it also ensures that higher education governance remains
responsive to the public.
Regent Geddes noted the board’s opposition to the bill text as written and initially amended,
“…we do not think it is clear that the voting right will stay in perpetuity, which the Nevada
Constitution holds.” Similarly, both State Chairman of the Independent American Party and State
President for Nevada Families for Freedom opposed AJR 5. The state president testified, “I
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would be far more comfortable with AJR 5 if it actually said that the election of the Board of
Regents would be guaranteed in the future. That is our most significant concern.” It was only
during this first AJR 5 hearing that the Las Vegas Metro Chamber of Commerce offered neutral
testimony; for all future testimony in both Sessions they lent support. The member stated the
Vegas Chamber believed “…the Nevada Constitution clearly states that the Board of Regents
already falls under the purview of Nevada's Legislature according to Article 11, Section 4 and
Section 7.” The Nevada Faculty Alliance (NFA) also testified neutral during the initial hearing.
The rep noted it was “partly because of uncertainty regarding the effect and intent of the
proposed and amended resolution.” He continued, “We have learned more here, but we have
serious general concerns. We strongly believe that having universities and colleges that are
independent of political influence is extremely important.” Closing, he repeated NFA’s position
adding, “… but we have strong concerns about taking out that small sliver of independence of
the Board of Regents, particularly for the higher education system that is really special in its
duties and responsibilities to the students and the citizens of Nevada.” In her closing remarks,
Senator Woodhouse hinted at future amendments to AJR 5. “…We have been taking notes about
the concerns that have been raised. Assemblyman Anderson and I will be working on some
possible additional amendments to this measure, and we will bring something back to you.”
Discussion and testimony in the 2019 committee hearings. In 2019, AJR 5 was again
twice heard by the Assembly Legislative Operations and Election Committee, and once by the
Senate Committees on Legislative Operations and Elections. AJR 5 was also mentioned during a
Senate Finance Committee meeting although the bill had no associated fiscal notes. Across both
houses, AJR 5 hearings were quite similar in format and messaging. The six-member Senate
committee welcomed four new Senators, of which one (James Ohrenschall) had previously sat
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on the Assembly committee in 2017. The ten-member Assembly committee experienced a
turnover of seven members.
The first Assembly hearing on AJR 5 in 2019. Much of the discussion in 2019 echoed
discussion that had occurred during the 2017 Session. Bill cosponsors reiterated the same points
they had previously made, and once again, invited-LCB legal analyst Mr. Powers offered a
similar historical perspective, however, this time he added a third case, State ex rel. Richardson
v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 147-48 (1953). He emphasized, “In that case, which is typical
for the Board of Regents, they relied on the King case and argued that the Board of Regents,
because it is a constitutional body, is beyond any control of the courts.”
Now a private citizen, Mr. Elliot Anderson addressed the bill’s newest policy dimension,
academic freedom, which was a 2017 amendment not widely discussed in that Session. He
stated, “As an additional benefit…we also included a provision in AJR 5 of the 79th Session that
would constitutionally enshrine academic freedom for Nevada faculty members to ensure that
political influence cannot rear its head in the teaching process.” He also addressed arguments
previously given in opposition to AJR 5. For example, he noted in 2017, the regents had argued
that the Board of Regents should remain in the Constitution because “the Legislature was too
political.” He stated, “I have already noted that this was not the framers' intent. The Nevada
Constitution never intended for the Board of Regents to be insulated from the political process.”
He added, AJR 5 “will allow our state to design a higher education system from the ground up,
without regard to what settlers from 1864 thought about what we should be doing in 2019.”
Just as Chairwoman Diaz had asked to make the record clear in 2017, her successor,
Democrat Chairwoman Sandra Jauregui, articulated, “I want to make the record clear. If this bill
passes, it does not seek to change the ability to elect the Board of Regents. Is that correct?” To
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which, Mr. Powers responded, “That is correct. The existing statutes in place would remain in
place if this were to be approved by the voters.” Then, he emphasized AJR 5 passage would give
future legislatures power to make the Board of Regents an appointed body or hybrid board via
statutes rather than having to amend the Constitution.
Of course—I just want to emphasize—the Legislature would be free to change those
statutes if it wanted to, but that would be a legislative policymaking choice. It could
move the Board of Regents from an elected body to an appointed body, or a hybrid body
where some members were elected and some members were appointed. Assembly Joint
Resolution 5 of the 79th Session itself does not do that; it just gives the Legislature the
power to do that.
Chairwomen Jauregui also inquired how AJR 5 passage “would alter the relationship between
the Board of Regents and the Executive Branch?” To which, Mr. Powers replied:
Right now, the Governor does not typically have much of a role in the operation or
management of the Board of Regents. [ ] Because the Board of Regents has that slice of
sovereign power, it maintains its own internal separation from other agencies in the
Executive Branch. If this constitutional amendment were approved by the voters and
became part of the Nevada Constitution, the Legislature, by setting the policy, could
give other officers and agencies in the Executive Branch, like the Governor, more of a
role in the administration and operation of the university.
All in all, Chairwoman Jauregui asked eight questions, which monopolized most of the hearing
except for two points of clarification from Republican Assemblyman Tom Roberts and Democrat
Assemblywoman Selena Torres.
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The differences between 2017 and 2019 Assembly hearings. In contrast to the absence
of supporting testimony during the first 2017 Assembly committee hearing, the 2019 hearing
witnessed a conglomerate of supporting testimony, including guest legislator Assemblywoman
Bilbray-Axelrod and representatives from the Vegas Chamber, The Lincy Institute, and Council
for a Better Nevada. Instead of neutrality, the NFA now opposed AJR 5. The rep stated in part
that removing the board from the Constitution entirely would make NSHE like any other
Executive Branch entity. “It will increase the possibility that a future Governor will seek to
control curricular and promotion decisions, or will seek to remove a regent, chancellor,
president, or even a faculty member, as can happen with other Executive Branch boards.”
However, the rep suggested, “The NFA could possibly support a revised constitutional
amendment that would make explicit the authority for the Legislature to set the number and
method of selection of regents without eliminating the Board of Regents entirely from the
Nevada Constitution, [ ].” The regents also switched their position from opposition to neutral,
indicating board members had not taken a position at the time of the hearing. Ultimately, AJR 5
overwhelmingly passed both houses in 2019, securing its path to a ballot measure vote by the
people in November 2020.
Finding: Unconventional Tactics May Induce Policy Punctuation and Reform
Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have contended “argumentation and creation of a new
understanding of an issue are at the heart of the political process” (p. 29). Thus, they have argued
policymaking is strongly shaped by changing definitions of both problems and solutions, and
“any time political actors can introduce new dimensions of conflict, they can destabilize a
previously stable situation” (p. 14). An extensive analysis of data suggested unlike policymaking
of AJR 11 and AB 331, AJR 5 cosponsors’ unconventional tactics used to define the policy
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image of Nevada’s postsecondary governance system were pivotal in mobilizing sufficient
legislative support in two consecutive Sessions and may favorably sway voters in November
2020, ultimately inducing for the first time, a policy punctuation and higher education
governance reform. Specifically, AJR 5 cosponsors cleverly designed a policy solution to
explicitly exclude any public loss of voting rights. AJR 5 also appeared to benefit both
legislature and faculty, thereby aiding legislators’ adoption of the bill. Cosponsors’ use of
historical court case analogies during committee hearings (Taliaferro, 1994) likely helped
establish a favorable reference from which legislators could evaluate problems AJR 5 aimed to
resolve (as cited in Zahariadis, 2003). Finally, their strategic manipulation of sequential decisionmaking, known as a salami tactic (Zahariadis, 2003), presumably facilitated the legislature’s
passage of AJR 5.
Clever policy design. Unlike AJR 11 in which a single bill sponsor offered a policy
solution unacceptable to voters since it removed their right to vote for some regents, AJR 5
cosponsors cleverly designed a policy solution without any apparent detriment to the public’s
right to vote. In fact, AJR 5 testimony was replete with assurances that the bill does not explicitly
change the Board of Regents election process. An interviewed higher education official
articulated, “…in 2019, especially in the Assembly, it was very clear that, ‘No, no, we don’t
want to take away the right to vote. No, no, we’re not going to change the fact that they’re
elected’.” Similarly, a legislator declared, “When Senator Woodhouse and Assemblyman
Anderson testified on AJR 5, they were very clear in that they would not remove the ability for
people to elect the Board of Regents…They were very, very clear on that.” The legislator stated,
“…we passed AJR 5 out of committee and onto the floor and we all voted on it, again, with the
understanding that we wouldn’t be removing the electability part from the board.”
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The cosponsors also crafted AJR 5 to explicitly benefit the legislature and faculty. One
interviewee noted a benefit for the legislature. With AJR 5’s passage, “…there would be a lot
more oversight from the legislature and that’s what the legislature is seeking.” Moreover, with
the removal of the Board of Regents from the Constitution, AJR 5 would abolish the board’s
“sovereign slice of power.” It would also remove the provision bill cosponsors have indicated is
an “impediment to reform.” Thus, as one interviewee stated, AJR 5 passage will make the
legislature’s job “easier” and “far more flexible.” By enshrining academic freedom, cosponsors
aimed to benefit faculty. In his 2019 testimony, Mr. Anderson stated, “As an additional benefit,
in the 79th Session, we also included a provision in AJR 5 of the 79th Session that would
constitutionally enshrine academic freedom for Nevada faculty members to ensure that political
influence cannot rear its head in the teaching process.” However, the LCB legal analyst testified
it would be up to future legislatures to define “reasonableness of academic freedom.” An
interview participant suggested inclusion of academic freedom was unnecessary and was likely
added to gain faculty support. The individual noted because academic freedom for faculty is
“well enshrined by the first amendment, by case law, and as promulgated by the AAUP
statement on academic freedom and tenure” it “does not need to be enshrined in the Nevada
Constitution for it to exist anyway.” Continuing, the person stated, “So putting that in the
Constitution, first of all, that was added without input from faculty groups. I believe Elliot
Anderson thought he was throwing faculty a bone to do that. [ ] So if it really does that, great.
Similarly, another participant suggested, academic freedom was added “to try and get the faculty
to go neutral on the bill.”
Historical case analogies. In contrast to AJR 11 and AB 331, historical case analogies
were another tactic bill cosponsors used during committee hearings that likely persuaded
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legislators to support AJR 5. Taliaferro (1994) has argued such an analogy may help establish a
reference from which policymakers can evaluate decision problems (as cited in Zahariadis,
2003). During committee hearings across both Sessions, LCB legal analyst shared historical case
information about “why the Board of Regents is in the Nevada Constitution and how the Board's
powers have been interpreted by the courts in Nevada.” He surmised, “What I think the case law
illustrates is that, indeed the courts have, in the end, favored the Legislature when it comes to
laws of general applicability. What it also illustrates is that the Board of Regents will probably
litigate each time the Legislature passes a statute that it thinks, in even the slightest way,
interferes with the Board of Regents' powers.” Several interview participants similarly
highlighted the analyst’s testimony, as they explained problems AJR 5 proposed to solve. For
example, one interviewee stated, “All the cases that flow sort of like a tree. The base of the tree
is King versus Board of Regents, and then other branches have formed that initially track back to
that King versus Board of Regents. The individual indicated, “oftentimes in the past, the regents
and the system of higher education have threatened to sue whenever the legislature tries to
reform. They try to use the Constitution as a sword to defeat those.” Another interviewee
acknowledged the historical analogies, stating “They used some examples during the hearing
where the Board of Regents kind of felt that they were autonomous and that they didn’t have any
other branch of government overseeing them [ ].” This participant indicated, AJR 5 passage
would result in clear roles, “that the Board of Regents isn’t a fourth branch of government…”
Salami tactic. Unlike AJR 11 and AB 331 policymaking, a third tactic AJR 5 cosponsors
seemingly employed to facilitate passage of AJR 5 through the legislature is what Zahariadis
(2003) has called a salami tactic. He contends strategic entrepreneurs generally have a grand
policy design and desired outcome. Since they are certain their preferred solution will not be
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adopted because it is too risky, they divide decision-making into discrete stages, sequentially
presenting decisions to policymakers. “Doing so promotes agreement in steps” (p. 93). By the
time policymakers realize they have been manipulated, it is too late to switch alternatives. Thus,
“they end up accepting an outcome in steps that they would have rejected as a whole” (p. 93).
While the 2019 legislature was considering AJR 5, Senator Woodhouse introduced to the
Senate Committee on Education SB 354, a follow-on bill to AJR 5. SB 354 mirrored AJR 11 in
that it called for an appointed-elected hybrid board with less members and shorter terms.
Republican Senator Keith Pickard liked the idea of a hybrid board however, he noted his
constituents liked to vote for regents, and then he asked, “Is SB 354 intended to be a placeholder
for how we begin or is this part of a bigger plan that we are not all aware of at this time?”
Senator Woodhouse replied in part, SB 354 was being presented now “…based on some
concerns that came forward because of AJR 5 and how it would be viewed when it was
presented to the voters in November 2020. There were concerns that there may be some
disconnect.” Ultimately, the Senate approved SB 354 fifteen to six.
A week later, Senator Woodhouse introduced SB 354 to the Assembly Legislative
Operations Committee. Like legislators who had supported parts of AJR 11, some committee
members favored board downsizing, but opposed SB 354’s hybrid concept. Assemblywoman
Torres stated, “If we wanted this to be a part of the legislation, to be a part of that joint
resolution, I feel that we should have included that in the discussion two years ago, quite
frankly.” Assemblyman Roberts noted, “I probably would not have supported the first bill [AJR
5] had I known this was going to be at the same time or contingent or connected to it.” Even
Senator Woodhouse’s AJR 5 cosponsor opposed SB 354. Mr. Anderson testified:
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I am here to testify against SB 354 in its current form. First, I would like to say that I
really take no joy in being here. I am a bit dumbfounded about the whole situation and
wish that this did not have to happen.
He underscored Nevadans’ voting history on bills that sought to remove their right to vote.
Recent Nevada history bears out a proposition, a proposition that I did not think needed
to be stated out loud: The people will not vote to get rid of their ability to select their own
representatives. The proposition of appointed regents died on the ballot in 2006, and the
proposition of appointed judges died even more overwhelmingly in 2010. And I forgot to
mention that the proposition of appointed Regents died in the Legislature in 2009 when
Senator Raggio tried to pass it for a second time. I believe he got it through 2007, but
then it died on the ballot. I believe the Senate voted it down in 2009, if I recall my history
correctly. I would note that since 2010, the electorate has grown more hostile, both on the
left and the right, to this sort of a proposal. It is a very populist electorate.
Then, he noted SB 354 passage would make public approval of AJR 5 nearly impossible, and he
implied AJR 5 would not have passed two consecutive Sessions had it called for a hybrid board.
It [SB 354] will make AJR 5 of the 79th Session difficult, if not impossible, to pass.
Moreover, having spoken to 61 legislators personally about AJR 5 of the 79th Session
last session, I do not think AJR 5 of the 79th Session would have passed last session if
appointed Regents were in the mix.
In closing, AJR 5 cosponsor asked committee members to focus on the grand design to reform
higher education rather than narrowly focusing on SB 354, which stood to jeopardize AJR 5.
Senate Bill 354 is an impediment to changing history and charting a new course for
higher education. It is time to look forward and not send mixed messages to the voters.
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The Legislature needs to focus on the power of the institution to reform higher education
and not too narrowly on those details at this point. Senate Bill 354 risks all that we have
achieved the last two sessions, and the Legislature needs to spend a great deal more time
considering 49 other models that are out there before making these changes.
SB 354 never made it out of the Assembly committee. However, some interview participants
suggested it may be back in the 2021 Session, presuming the public approves AJR 5.
Summary
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium
theory. The primary research question that guided this study was: How has the state of Nevada’s
legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education
governance entity? A secondary question asked: How is the legislative policymaking process of
the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to
and/or different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly
Bill 331, two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed? Three
overarching themes emerged from extensive data analysis: (1) public support of AJR 11 was
insufficient to overcome a structure-induced equilibrium created by the Nevada Constitution; (2)
the policy solution AB 331 offered was too extreme and complex to garner legislative support;
and (3) perchance, unconventional tactics AJR 5 cosponsors used in the legislative policymaking
process of AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation that ultimately reforms
Nevada’s higher education governance entity. In the next chapter, I discuss the findings and their
implications for policy, practice, and theory.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
Introduction
Since McLendon (2003b) first reported a dearth of scholarship focusing on state-level
policymaking processes to reform higher education governance, few studies have sought to
address this gap (McLendon, 2003a; Mills, 2007; Tandberg & Anderson, 2012). Similar to these
studies, this case study aimed to address McLendon’s call for research by examining the
policymaking process of three legislative bills that have sought to reform Nevada’s statewide
postsecondary governance entity. In contrast to these studies, however, this research study
examined state-level policymaking that primarily resulted in policy stasis, rather than policy
change. This chapter is comprised seven sections. In the first section I provide a brief overview
of the study. Then, I discuss the answers to my research questions, followed by implications for
policy, practice, and theory, respectively. In the fifth section, I highlight study limitations.
Finally, I offer recommendations for future research and conclude this study.
Overview of Study
Research has suggested Nevada is deficient in meeting its educated workforce needs.
Policy scholars (NCPPHE, 2005; Richardson, Bracco, Callan, & Finney, 1999) have contended
state higher education governance entities built for other times and other public purposes may
crowd out attention to urgent public priorities. The state of Nevada has maintained its single
state-level higher education governance system largely intact since its creation in 1864 despite
policy scholars’ call for change. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the
preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework
of punctuated equilibrium theory, which may provide useful information to Nevada’s state
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policymakers as they seek to address their educated workforce needs via postsecondary
governance reform. This study sought to explore the Nevada legislative policymaking process,
why policy actors responded as they did and the context in which they responded, by examining
the life cycle of three unique higher education governance reform bills. The primary research
question guiding this study was: how has the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process
facilitated the preservation of the statewide higher education governance entity? A secondary
question asked: how is the legislative policymaking process of the ongoing higher education
governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5, similar to and/or different from the process
that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and Assembly Bill 331, two former higher
education governance reform bills that were not passed? Interviews with 12 policy actors and a
review of over 150 public documents revealed three overarching themes: (1) public support of
AJR 11 was insufficient to overcome a structure-induced equilibrium created by the Nevada
Constitution; (2) the policy solution AB 331 offered was too extreme and complex to garner
legislative support; and (3) perchance, unconventional tactics AJR 5 cosponsors employed in the
legislative policymaking process of AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation
that ultimately reforms Nevada’s higher education governance entity.
Answers to Research Questions
Legislative policymaking is both an art and a science with many stakeholders, interest
groups, and citizens seeking to influence the legislative policy process and policy outcomes
(Hillman et al., 2015). In the case of Nevada, legislative policymaking of AJR 11 and AB 331
resulted in rejection of both bills. However, AJR 5 policymaking continues and the bill’s fate
will be determined in November 2020 when Nevada citizens vote on its ballot measure. Thus,
findings associated with AJR 11 and AB 331 offer answers to my primary research question:
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How has the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of
the statewide higher education governance entity? The finding associated with AJR 5 enables a
cross-case analysis to answer my secondary question: How is the legislative policymaking
process of the ongoing higher education governance reform bill, Assembly Joint Resolution 5,
similar to and/or different from the process that addressed Assembly Joint Resolution 11 and
Assembly Bill 331, two former higher education governance reform bills that were not passed?
AJR 11
AJR 11 primarily illustrates how the Nevada Constitution, established in 1864, created a
structure-induced equilibrium, facilitating the preservation of Nevada’s statewide higher
education governance entity known as the Board of Regents. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have
suggested a codifying structure, such as a state Constitution, can firmly establish a policy venue,
or decision-making body, making future policy change unlikely. As legal analyst Mr. Powers
testified, framers of the Nevada Constitution dedicated a slice of sovereign power to the Board of
Regents. That narrow carve out from the Executive Branch ascribed to the board control and
management of internal affairs of the State University. Thus, the Constitution squarely placed a
considerable portion of public postsecondary education policymaking in the hands of regents.
This suggests the framers’ intent was to insulate the State University from political intrusion. As
academic scholars (Glenny, 1959; McLendon, 2003b; Tandberg, 2013) have pointed out, a main
reason state higher education governance entities were initiated was to serve as a buffer between
academic institutions and the state. More importantly, the constitutional framers’ inclusion of the
Board of Regents suggests their preference for incremental policy change rather than rapid
punctuation. Democratic theorists would likely agree structures often serve to impose stability
and check momentary passions of the people (Breunig & Koski, 2012).
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The Nevada Constitution also bestowed upon its citizens power to vote for their regent
representatives, essentially making Nevada voters key policymakers in the higher education
policy domain. Research has suggested existing structures may channel policymakers’ actions
along established policy paths, reinforcing policy stasis (Wilford, 1994). I argue this equally
applies to citizen policymakers, especially when their voting rights are at stake. Commenting on
AJR 11, an interviewee also suggested, once it is established that public representative positions
are elected, it is hard to change that because people see it as taking away a right that they have.
This insinuates voters are indispensable allies when seeking a constitutional amendment.
Besides highlighting the Constitution’s role in preserving Nevada’s statewide higher
education governance entity, AJR 11 also shows how absence of both, widespread support and a
public education campaign in favor of AJR 11, and to a lesser extent media’s push to vote ‘no’
on Ballot Question No. 9, inhibited public adoption of AJR 11 and further buttressed the
structure-induced equilibrium. In Nevada, constitutional change is a lengthy five-year process.
First, an amendment must past two consecutive Sessions and then voters must approve it.
Consequently, sustained momentum is imperative to increase the likelihood of policy adoption.
As postsecondary literature acknowledges, a governor can play an influential role in the
legislative policymaking process (Hendrickson et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 2015). Governor
Guinn’s backing, along with sufficient negotiations across party aisles, helped Assemblywoman
Giunchigliani triumphantly push AJR 11 through the legislature. However, that level of sustained
effort was absent in the months leading up to the ballot measure vote as Assemblywoman
Giunchigliani pursued another office, and no other group or individual stepped up to lend
support. Mintrom and Norman (2009) have contended, a policy entrepreneur or advocate is often
needed to promote policy adoption. Similarly, Kingdon (2003) has suggested a policy
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entrepreneur, who invests time, money, and resources may drive policy change. In addition to the
entrepreneur’s role, elevated media attention may induce policy change (Baumgartner & Jones,
2009). However, AJR 11 suggests the media encouraged policy stasis by espousing a ‘no’ vote
on Ballot Question No. 9. Ultimately, voters agreed. Thus, the legislative policymaking process
of AJR 11 facilitated the preservation of Nevada’s statewide postsecondary governance entity.
AB 331
AB 331 epitomizes how legislative policymakers’ portrayal of a policy image, including
its problems and solutions, resulted in policy stasis, facilitating the preservation of Nevada’s
statewide higher education governance entity. Rochefort and Cobb (1994) have noted the way
problems are presented and defined serve to explain, describe, recommend, and mostly persuade.
A former legislator suggested policymakers understood the positive intent of AB 331 and agreed
with the funding inequities community colleges faced. Likewise, two sitting college presidents’
testimony reflected AB 331’s positive intentions, despite also expressing opposition to the bill.
However, legislative policymakers recognized “breaking off” community colleges was a solution
too extreme in terms of costs and likelihood of success in resolving AB 331’s problems. As
Zahariadis (2003) has indicated and AB 331 revealed, people are generally loss averse. In other
words, policymakers dislike losing more than they like winning (Zahariadis, 2003).
The complexity of the solution AB 331 offered further illustrates how the policy image
promoted policy stability. Zahariadis (2003) has contended a simpler policy image can gain more
credibility because policymakers often acknowledge and debate only a few dimensions of any
given policy. Assemblyman Hansen insinuated the complexity of AB 331 as he selectively
introduced what he considered pertinent features of the bill’s 325 sections. In highlighting the
Articulation and Transfer Board, Assemblyman Hansen unintentionally simplified the policy
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image to a single dimension that legislators soon discovered could be implemented under the
existing governance structure without adoption of AB 331. As Baumgartner and Jones (2009)
have contended, no single policymaker is in a position to guarantee his solution will be adopted
even if the government decides to focus on solving a problem.
When one considers policy image, one must also examine policy venue (Baumgartner &
Jones, 2009). AB 331 demonstrates how a policy subsystem combined with issue specialists
impacted the legislative policymaking process and perpetuated the status quo. As previously
noted, the Nevada Constitution securely established the Board of Regents as a statewide policy
subsystem responsible for public higher education decision-making. AB 331 revealed
consequential negotiations that occurred behind the scenes between regents and college
presidents likely prevented the bill from making the legislature’s decision-making agenda. An
interviewee disclosed community colleges gained power within the system, which she suggested
was the reason why college presidents were okay with AB 331 dying. According to Baumgartner
and Jones (2009) issue specialists are advantaged in their ability to favorably portray an issue to
non-specialists. By virtue of their position and academic expertise, college presidents are
considered issue specialists in the higher education policy domain. AB 331 suggests the four in
situ college presidents cogently portrayed their bill opposition, persuading legislators to bypass
AB 331 and effectively sealing the bill’s demise. Thus, the failure of AB 331 reinforced the
preservation of Nevada’s statewide postsecondary governance entity.
AJR 5
As depicted in Table 3, the legislative policymaking process of AJR 5 mostly differs
from the policymaking of AJR 11 and AB 331. Although all three bills sought higher education
governance reform, only AJR 11 and AJR 5 proposed constitutional amendments, insinuating
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similar policy processes. However, other than the fact that both bills shared bipartisan support,
their policymaking processes, along with the policymaking process of AB 331, largely contrast.

Table 3
Comparison of Legislative Policymaking Features Across Bills
AJR 11

AB 331

AJR 5

NSHE’s unacceptable
Inefficient &
behavior, legislature’s
inequitable system for information access, &
community colleges
Nevada’s antiquated
governance system

Problem

Politicization of BOR
& cost of BOR

Solution

Blended board with
member & term
reduction

Separate college
governance &
Articulation &
Transfer Board

Support

Legislature

Former college
presidents

Opposition

Citizen lobbyists,
chancellor, BOR, &
media

Legislature & in situ
college presidents

BOR & NFA

Policy Outcome

Public rejected

Legislature rejected

Remains undecided

Policy Reform Goals

Clear

Clear

Unknown

Political Climate

Bipartisan

Not voted on

Bipartisan

Policy
Images

Policy
Venues

Remove BOR from
Constitution &
enshrine academic
freedom
Legislature, Vegas
Chamber, The Lincy
Institute, Council for
a Better Nevada

Unlike AJR 11 and AB 331, whose legislative policymaking resulted in the preservation
of Nevada’s public postsecondary governance structure, AJR 5 policymaking is ongoing and its
fate will be determined in November 2020 when Nevada citizens vote on the bill. AJR 5
underscores the invaluable role of political entrepreneurs in the legislative policymaking
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process. Herweg, Zahariadis, and Zohlnhöfer (2018) have contended the formal leadership
positions of political entrepreneurs uniquely allow them to further a policy proposal from inside
the government and work for its adoption. Similar to Assemblywoman Giunchigliani’s
sponsorship of AJR 11, AJR 5 cosponsors, Senator Woodhouse and Assemblyman Anderson,
were pivotal in mobilizing sufficient legislative support in two consecutive Sessions. However,
unlike the approach AJR 11’s sponsor used, AJR 5 cosponsors’ unconventional tactics may also
favorably sway voters in November 2020, ultimately inducing for the first time, a policy
punctuation and higher education governance reform.
Kingdon (1984, 2003) has suggested the policymaking process is largely determined by
the artful connection of problems and solutions (as cited in Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). In
contrast to the extreme complex solution Assemblyman Hansen designed into AB 331, AJR 5
cosponsors cleverly crafted a policy solution to explicitly exclude any public loss of voting
rights. AJR 5 also appeared to benefit both legislature and faculty, thus aiding legislators’
adoption of the bill. As Zahariadis (2003) has indicated, and as both AJR 11 and AB 331
revealed, voters and legislators are generally loss averse. This suggests AJR 5 cosponsors
recognized the importance of language in advantageously framing the bill’s problems and
solutions. In addition, Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have argued when people view a problem
as stemming from government or human sources (versus nature), they are more likely to demand
government action. Bill sponsors across AJR 11, AB 331, and AJR 5 similarly exposed the
Board of Regents and NSHE as the source of Nevada’s higher education woes. However, AJR 5
cosponsors’ exclusive and repeated use of historical court case analogies during committee
hearings (Taliaferro, 1994) likely helped establish a reference from which legislators could
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favorably assess problems AJR 5 aimed to resolve (as cited in Zahariadis, 2003). Thus, the
cosponsors neatly aligned AJR 5’s problem and proposed solution.
The most striking difference across the three bills seems to be AJR 5 cosponsors’ salami
tactic, or manipulation of sequential decision-making, which presumably facilitated the
legislature’s passage of AJR 5 (Zahariadis, 2003). Multiple testimony and discussion in the 2019
Session illuminated the cosponsors’ salami tactic. Especially insightful was Mr. Anderson’s
opposition to SB 354, Senator Woodhouse’s trailer bill to AJR 5, which would have removed
citizens’ right to vote for some regents and most likely would have caused voters to reject AJR 5
in November 2020. Zahariadis (2003) has argued the ability to control the legislature’s decisionmaking agenda rests only with highly placed entrepreneurs. Despite his return as a private
citizen, Mr. Anderson seemed to still carry significant legislative influence in 2019. Thus, it is
likely he will continue to invest his time and resources, advocating for AJR 5 until voters decide.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Exactly what will be the fate of AJR 5 remains uncertain, and predicting voter turnout is
always difficult, especially in light of the recent coronavirus pandemic and what will no doubt be
a politically-charged Presidential Election year. To be sure, the policymaking process of AJR 5
specifically, has policy and practice implications for Nevada’s postsecondary governance entity
and Nevada’s higher education system, which Senator Woodhouse aptly testified belongs to all
Nevadans. Consequently, it is prudent to examine these implications given the high stakes and
potential consequences for all Nevadans.
Theoretically, passage of AJR 5 will further burden the Nevada Legislature as legislators
strive “to provide by statute for the governance, control, and management of the State
University.” Similar to Nevada’s Board of Regents, the State Legislature is comprised of elected,
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part-time representatives, who may or may not have direct higher education experience. The
literature has suggested most legislators are constrained by the breadth of their duties and are
challenged to sustain deep involvement in any single area (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). As two
interview participants articulated, it may turn out to be a case of “be careful what you ask for.”
Additionally, if in fact SB 354 is a harbinger of what lies ahead for Nevada’s higher education
governance entity, Governor Sisolak’s role in higher education governance will certainly expand
to include appointing some regents. Moreover, his prior regent experience suggests his greater
presence in the higher education policy domain. As a former President of the State Higher
Education Executive Officers agency and his colleagues at the Associations of Governing Board
have pointed out, it is both onerous and unwise for legislators and governors to try to directly
control higher education (Lingenfelter et al., 2008). Rather, the path to success demands clarity
of purpose along with appropriate inclusion of those most impacted by policy change.
Exactly how Nevada’s higher education governance entity might be reformed should
AJR 5 pass is ultimately a decision for future legislatures. When I asked interview participants,
“If the public passes AJR 5, how do you see Nevada’s postsecondary governance changing,” all
12 participants expressed their unabashed bewilderment because AJR 5 only removes the Board
of Regents’ constitutional authority and enshrines academic freedom. It is void of any policy
specifics. Distinguished postsecondary governance scholar, Aims McGuinness (2015, p. 2) has
offered seven guidelines for states who seek higher education governance reorganization. Here I
offer a condensed version of his guidelines, which may aid Nevada’s state policymakers as they
seek to address the state’s educated workforce needs via postsecondary governance reform.
(1) Focus first on ends, not means.
(2) Be explicit about the specific problems that are the catalysts for the reorganization.
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(3) Ask if reorganization is the only or most effective means for addressing the problems.
(4) Weigh the costs of reorganization against the short- and long-term benefits.
(5) Recognize that a good system balances state needs with college and university needs.
(6) Distinguish between state coordination and institutional governance.
(7) Examine the total policy structure and process rather than only the formal
postsecondary education structure.
Ultimately, as McGuinness (2015) has suggested, the challenge is to ensure the postsecondary
governance entity and higher education policies foster proper institutional autonomy and
institutional responsiveness to public priorities. Similarly, Lingenfelter et al. (2008) have
suggested a postsecondary governance structure may help or hinder educational progress,
however, if key ingredients (i.e., strategic vision, shared responsibility, leadership, professional
capacity, trust, focus on priorities, the availability of solid information, and the ability to build
consensus) are absent, changing the statewide structure cannot accomplish much.
Implications for Theory
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand the preservation of Nevada’s
higher education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium
theory. Punctuated equilibrium theory suggests the policymaking process is defined by long
periods of stability and incremental policy change. Occasionally, the process is marked by major
policy change as policy images are redefined and issues shift from monopolistic policy venues,
or policy subsystems, into the larger macropolitical arena. Findings from this study support the
theory and bolster several of Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (2009, pp. 238-243) most important
findings based on their extensive research across many policy domains. Specifically, AJR 11
illustrates how “Policy subsystems are often institutionalized as ‘structure-induced equilibria,’ in

105

which a prevailing policy understanding dominates.” According to the policy scholars, equilibria
can be changed only by changing the institutions themselves. AJR 11 also shows how governor
involvement can be decisive in legislative policymaking. AB 331 lends credence to
Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (2009) finding, “Problems and solutions are linked but are considered
separately.” Thus, policymaking may result in policy stasis rather than change. Last, AJR 5
underscores the entrepreneur’s advocacy role and bolsters the scholars’ finding, “Intervention of
the macropolitical institutions generally reinforces the possibilities of rapid change.”
Limitations
While a few policy scholars have argued against single-state case studies for their lack of
generalizability, others have contended it is “soundness of theory and rigor of analysis, rather
than the number of states, that makes research valid and important” (Nicholson-Crotty & Meier,
2002, p. 411). Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2002) have also noted scholars of state policymaking
“should be interested in not only what happens across states, but also what happens within them”
(pp. 412-413). Ultimately, the application of policy theory to a single state like Nevada
facilitated a more complex, contextual understanding of the state’s legislative policymaking
process and provided support for the theoretical concepts of Baumgartner’s and Jones’ (1993,
2009) punctuated equilibrium theory.
A particular challenge I faced during this study was contacting Nevada legislators via
their public email address; some did not respond since the legislature was not in session. In some
instances, former legislators were deceased. Additionally, some interview participants declined
the interview or opted not to answer some interview questions because of their position and
ongoing AJR 5 legislation. Another aspect that likely tempered some participants’ interview
responses was my graduate assistantship at The Lincy Institute, which I held for duration of this
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study and disclosed at the start of each interview. Representatives of The Lincy Institute have
previously testified in support of AJR 5 and other past postsecondary governance reform
legislation. On the contrary, my position may have facilitated some participants’ candor.
Future Research
The findings of this study suggests several areas worthy of further research to better
understand the legislative policymaking process associated with higher education governance
reform in Nevada. While this study closely examined the role of legislators in the policymaking
process of higher education governance reform, Moe (1990) has suggested the fundamental
question in understanding why structural choices turn out as they do is: how do interest groups
decide what kind of structures they want politicians to provide (as cited in Lowry, 2007)? Thus,
an examination of interest groups associated with Nevada’s higher education governance reform
legislation may offer relevant information about the legislative policymaking process and
potentially provide insight about the future of postsecondary education in Nevada. Another
question worthy of investigation is how the assignment of bills to specific committees may
influence higher education governance reform policy outcomes. Both AJR 11 and AJR 5 were
assigned to the Legislative Operations and Election Committees, rather than the Education
Committees despite implications for higher education. Similarly, a future study might examine
how ballot measure language and the sequencing of questions influence public policy outcomes.
More specifically, how is language and information from enrolled bills, along with public
testimony, conveyed in ballot measure questions and how does that affect policy outcomes? An
investigation of AJR 5’s ballot measure specifically, may further illuminate Nevada’s legislative
policymaking associated with higher education governance reform.
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As previously indicated, AJR 5 policymaking is ongoing. However, should AJR 5 pass, a
number of research areas are possible. For example, who will decide the next steps in the
postsecondary reform process and how will they make that decision? How will the governor’s
expanded role impact Nevada’s higher education outcomes? How will the legislature balance
institutional accountability and autonomy? How will the legislature define academic freedom?
What will be the unintended consequences of the bill and who will be impacted? How will the
buffering role of the Board of Regents change and how will that impact Nevada’s postsecondary
institutions? What will be the role of the legislature in shared governance? How will governance
reform shape Nevada’s educational outcomes and achieve the state’s workforce needs? To be
sure, the possible policy implementation and evaluation research questions seem limitless.
Conclusion
Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have theorized policymaking process is often defined by
long periods of stability and incremental policy change. Sometimes, however, the process is
marked by major policy change. The findings of this study primarily illustrate how Nevada’s
legislative policymaking process of two different higher education governance reform bills
resulted in policy stability. Additionally, they suggest the unconventional legislative
policymaking associated with AJR 5 may induce for the first time, a policy punctuation that
ultimately reforms Nevada’s higher education governance entity. Of course, one can never be
certain of a policy’s outcome until it happens. Nevada citizens will ultimately determine the
outcome of AJR 5.
Nevada’s newest slogan, “What happens here, only happens here,” proudly boasts the
state’s uniqueness. Indeed, Nevada’s statewide postsecondary governance entity mirrors this
uniqueness in its regent election process. However, the Board of Regents’ constitutional
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authority is not uncommon, rather it is purposeful. And as Baumgartner and Jones (2009) have
reported, “There is no punctuated equilibrium process leading toward inevitable progress” (p.
xxv). Consequently, as Nevada’s legislative policymakers and higher education stakeholders
seek to reform the statewide higher education governance entity, they may be wise to follow
McGuinness’ reform guidelines and heed the message from Lingenfelter and his associates
(2008) that without key ingredients, such as strategic vision, shared responsibility, trust, and
consensus building, changing Nevada’s statewide governance entity cannot accomplish much.
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Appendices
Appendix A
State Postsecondary Governance Reform from 2000 to 2020
Status/
Citation

State

Title

Summary

Adopted
2008-11-06,
FAC 6A10.006

Florida

Board of Regents
Replaced by
Board of
Governors

Amends rule so that Board of Regents is
replaced by the Board of Governors.
Members are appointed by Governor subject
to Senate confirmation.

Approved
by voters
2008-11-04,
Amendment
1

Louisiana

Limit to State
Education Board
and Board of
Regents
Membership

To provide for term limits for members of
the Board of Regents, and other state boards.
A person who has served for more than two
and one-half terms in three consecutive terms
shall not be appointed or elected to the
succeeding term; and to provide for a limit
on service on more than one such board or
commission.

Signed into
law
2007-04-22,
HB 1883

Washington Coordinating
Board Revisions

Signed into
law
2003-10-11,
SB 644

California

Community
Colleges: Board
of Governors

Revises the higher education coordinating
board. Effective July 22, 2007, the Executive
Director of the HECB is appointed by the
Governor from a list of three names
submitted by the HECB.
Revises the membership of the Board of
Governors of the California State
Community Colleges to include 12 members
appointed by the Governor with advice and
consent of 2/3 of membership of the Senate.

Signed into
law
2002-06-13,
SB 647

Kansas

Higher Education The bill specifies that the State Board of
Coordination Act Regents will serve as the representative of
the public postsecondary education system
before the Governor and the Legislature.

Signed into
law
2000-06-01,
HB 2263

Florida

Reorganizing
Florida's
Education
System

Creates Florida Education Governance
Reorganization Act of 2000; Creates a
governance system that deals with K-20
education. The new board will oversee
Florida's education system from
Kindergarten to grad school.

Note. Adapted from “Education Commission of the States (ECS) State Policy Database,”
retrieved on April 23, 2020.
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Appendix B
Summary of State Governance Models
Board Type
Statewide Coordinating Board

Number of States
20

States
Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
and Washington

Statewide Governing Board

8

Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota and Rhode
Island

System/Institutional Boards

22

Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Utah, Vermont
West Virginia ,Wisconsin,
Wyoming

Note. Adapted from “Policy Brief for AJR 5,” by D. Cooper and V. Rosser, 2018.
.
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Appendix C
Joint Resolutions to Change Nevada Board of Regents
Year
1957,
1959

Bill
AJR 12

What It Proposed
Appointment of regents

1959,
1961
1961,
1963
1963

SJR 10

Appointment of regents

SJR 8

Appointment of regents and increase number of
regents to nine
Appointment of regents

1967

SJR 20

1969

AJR 31

1969

AJR 41

Place University of Nevada under control of
Legislation to be exercised through a Board of
Regents appointed by governor
Create two separate elected Board of Regents for
two state universities
Appointment of regents by governor

1975

AJR 42

Legislature control Board of Regents

1979

SJR 12

Appointment of regents and create 5-member
Board of Trustees for system of community
colleges

1981

AJR 22

Appointment of regents

Failed in Assembly

1983

AJR 3

Create separate Board of Regents for community
colleges

Failed in Assembly

1985

AJR 21

Appointment of regents

Failed in Assembly

1986 2002
2003,
2005,
2006
2007
2017,
2019,
2020

SJR 12

Result
1959: Passed Assembly; not
reported from committee in
Senate
1961: Not reported from
committee in Senate
1963: Died in Senate
Passed Senate; not reported
from Assembly committee
Passed Senate; Died in
Assembly
Not reported from
Assembly committee
Passed Assembly but died
on third reading in Senate
Not reported from
Assembly committee
Passed Senate; Not reported
from Assembly committee

No constitutional changes proposed
AJR 11

SJR 4
AJR 5

Governor appoint some regents and some remain
by election (and specify number and terms of
members)
Legislature to provide for organization and regent
duties; regent appointment by governor

2006: Voters failed to
approve

Remove Board of Regents from constitution

Passed both houses 2017 &
2019; public votes 2020

Supposed to return 2009
session; uncertain if it did

Note. Adapted from “Background Information Higher Education Governance,” by C. Stonefield,
2003, Nevada Legislative Council Bureau Background Paper No. 03-5, pp. 7-8.
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Appendix D
Recruitment Email

Dear __________________,
This is a research study.
I'd like to schedule a 20-30 minute call with you to discuss your role in Nevada’s state-level
policymaking process as it pertains to higher education governance reform legislation.
I am a PhD student completing my dissertation at UNLV in the Educational Psychology and
Higher Education Department. I am conducting research on Nevada’s legislative policymaking
process associated with postsecondary governance reform. You are receiving this email because
of your knowledge and experience on this topic.
The purpose of this qualitative case study is to understand the preservation of Nevada’s higher
education governance entity through the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium theory.
The focus is on examining the Nevada legislative policymaking process, why policy actors
responded as they did and the context in which they responded. This research is being completed
under the supervision of Dr. Vicki Rosser, a full professor in the Department of Educational
Psychology and Higher Education at UNLV. This study has been approved as an exempt project
under UNLV IRB board.
Interviewees will be asked to share their experiences with Nevada’s state-level policymaking
process as it pertains to higher education governance reform legislation. They will not be
compensated for their time.
I appreciate your assistance and alternatively, if you are not available do you have suggestions of
individuals I can interview? I look forward to hearing from you or your office.
Sincerely,
Deanna Cooper
Doctoral Student, Higher Education
cooped2@unlv.nevada.edu
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Appendix E
Interview Protocol
Date/time of interview:
Place:
Interviewee:
Position of interviewee:
Introduce myself, confirm informed consent, and ask approval to tape-record interview. Briefly
describe study—this research examines how the legislative policymaking process has contributed
to the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity (Board of Regents),
specifically studying 3 higher education governance reform bills (AJR 5, AB 331, and AJR 11).
Policy & Political Climate
1. How has the political climate in Nevada changed over the 21st century?
2. How would you describe the climate surrounding higher education governance reform?
3. To what extent do you think higher education governance reform is a partisan issue?
Policy Images
4. From your perspective, what problem was/is the bill trying to resolve?
5. What made the bill a priority for consideration (any specific event/incidence)?
6. How would you characterize the tone of the press coverage surrounding the bill?
Policy Venues
7. What individuals or groups initiated the push for change?
8. What individuals or groups supported the change?
9. What strategies or tactics did they use?
10. What individuals or groups opposed the change?
11. What strategies or tactics did they use to block change?
Policy Outcome
12. If the public passes AJR 5, how do you see postsecondary governance changing?
13. Is there anything else you would like to share with me? Is there anyone else you would
recommend I interview?
Thank them for participating in this interview. Assure her/him of confidentiality of responses.
Advise them that you will send them a copy of the transcript so they can confirm their responses.
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Appendix F
Informed Consent

INFORMED CONSENT
Department of Educational Psychology and Higher Education
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

TITLE OF STUDY:
Preserving Nevada’s Higher Education Governance Entity: A Case Study
INVESTIGATOR(S): Vicki Rosser, (702) 895-1432; Deanna Cooper, (702) 361-1881
For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, any complaints, or comments regarding
the manner in which the study is being conducted, contact the UNLV Office of Research
Integrity – Human Subjects at 702-895-2794, toll free at 877-895-2794 or via email at
IRB@unlv.edu.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Purpose of the Study
You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this qualitative case study is to
understand the preservation of Nevada’s higher education governance entity through the
theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium theory.
Participants
You are being asked to participate in the study because you fit these criteria: you have
knowledge and/or experience in the state-level policymaking process as it pertains to higher
education governance reform legislation in Nevada.
Procedures
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to do the following: participate in
interviews to share your experiences in the state-level policymaking process as it pertains to
higher education governance reform legislation in Nevada.
Benefits of Participation
There may not be direct benefits to you as a participant in this study. However, we hope to learn
how the state of Nevada’s legislative policymaking process facilitated the preservation of the
statewide higher education governance entity.
Risks of Participation
There are risks involved in all research studies. This study may include only minimal risks. Over
the course of participating in the interview you may become uncomfortable answering questions
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and may refuse to answer. You will not be excluded from the research project if you decide not
to answer questions which make you feel uncomfortable.
Cost /Compensation
There may not be financial cost to you to participate in this study. The study will take anywhere
from 20 minutes to one hour of your time. You will not be compensated for your time.
Confidentiality
All information gathered in this study will be kept as confidential as possible. No reference will
be made in written or oral materials that could link you to this study as an interview participant
unless approved by you. To the extent that your role is a matter of public record, I may reference
your name without disclosing you as an interview participant. All records will be stored in a
locked facility at UNLV for 3 years after completion of the study. After the storage time the
information gathered will be deleted from the computer.
Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study or in any
part of this study. You may withdraw at any time without prejudice to your relations with
UNLV. You are encouraged to ask questions about this study at the beginning or any time during
the research study.
Participant Consent:
I have read the above information and agree to participate in this study. I have been able to ask
questions about the research study. I am at least 18 years of age. A copy of this form has been
given to me.
Signature of Participant

Date

Participant Name (Please Print)
I agree to be audiotaped for the purpose of this research study.
Signature of Participant

Date

Participant Name (Please Print)
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Appendix G
Attempts at Punctuation
2003

2005

2006

2017

2019

2020

AJR 11
Passed Nevada
Legislature
first time

AJR 11
Passed Nevada
Legislature
second time

AJR 11
Voters
rejected
ballot
measure vote

AB 331
Died in
Assembly

AJR 5
Passed Nevada
Legislature
second time

Public votes
on ballot
measure in
November
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AJR 5
Passed
Nevada
Legislature
first time

Appendix H
Case Histories
King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533 (1948)
There, the Legislature enacted a bill to create the Advisory Board of Regents. The
Advisory Board of Regents was essentially a shadow board that had all rights and
privileges of the full elected Board of Regents, except the advisory board could not vote
on anything that the full Board of Regents could vote on. The Nevada Supreme Court
found this unprecedented, unusual, and unique special legislation. They struck it down.
The fear of the court was that the Legislature would then create shadow bodies to provide
advice to all the Executive Branch officers, so there would be an advisory board to the
Governor and an advisory board to the Secretary of State, and so forth. Because of the
unique nature of the advisory board in King, it was struck down as unconstitutional by
invading the sovereign slice of power that the Board of Regents had. However, in that
case, the Nevada Supreme Court made clear that the Board's power to control the internal
management and affairs at the university was subject to the traditional legislative rights
that are recognized by the power of the Legislature to pass laws of general application.
(“Nevada Assembly Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections Minutes,” 2017,
March 2, pp. 7-8 )
State ex rel. Richardson v. Board of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 147-48 (1953)
In that case, the Board of Regents terminated a professor after a hearing for cause. The
professor then brought an action for judicial review, saying that the Board of Regents did
not have cause to terminate his tenured status as a professor. In that case, which is typical
for the Board of Regents, they relied on the King case and argued that the Board of
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Regents, because it is a constitutional body, is beyond any control of the courts.
Obviously, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected that proposition. However, it gives you
an example of how the Board of Regents uses the King case to base its decision-making
because it believes it gives us this large slice of sovereign power when it is actually a
very narrow slice of sovereign power. In that case, the Nevada Supreme Court found the
Board of Regents was subject to judicial review and that the case could be reviewed by
the courts to determine whether the Board of Regents properly dismissed that professor
for cause. (“Nevada Assembly Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections
Minutes,” 2019, February 21, p. 8 )
Board of Regents v. Oakley, 637 P.2d 1199 (1981)
In that case, the university adopted a policy requiring professors to retire at the age of 70;
however, the general law in Nevada prohibits age discrimination. The professors who did
not want to retire said that the university did not have the power to dismiss them based on
their age policy. In this case, based on King, the university argued that it had unique
constitutional status that gives it virtual autonomy and immunity from the state's policy
established by the Legislature. The Nevada Supreme Court flatly rejected that
proposition. What the Nevada Supreme Court found is a generally applicable law of
statewide application does apply to the university, as long as it does not unreasonably
interfere with the internal management of the university. In that case, the court found that
the general age discrimination policy did not unreasonably interfere with the university's
age practices; therefore, the university was subject to that general age discrimination law.
(“Nevada Assembly Committee on Legislative Operations and Elections Minutes,” 2017,
March 2, p. 8 )
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